Filed under ..., Blog by T. Miles on 27 May 2010 at 7:23 pm
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A herd, starved to death, in North Mali. These animals represent many years of saved wealth and future investment for Malian pastoralists.
Hopefully by now everyone knows that parts of West Africa, especially pockets of Chad and Niger, are struggling with the worst food shortages since 2005. Alex Thurston reports that international humanitarian agencies, as well as increasingly concerned governments, are now worried that this crisis is more generalized than first reported (last September), striking areas of Mauritania and Mali.
In Mali, there is a crisis in the north (mostly Kidal Region) right now, with press reports of huge numbers of animals lost to the mostly pastoralist residents. As in Niger, prices for forage have skyrocketed, prices for animals have plummeted, so that recent reports have talked of Malians trading female goats – the future of their herds – for a single bag of rice in Algerian border markets. Malian press reports talk of traveling through rural Kidal last week, counting corpse after corpse of starved livestock, the very source of pastoralist livelihoods. Those that can have moved south, increasing the pressure on pasture and farm land, surely also risking more communal tension. Kidal Region is already rife with armed unemployed men, competing smuggling rings, and simmering tribal vendettas. The overflow from this must add sparks to the already smoldering Tombuctu and Gao Regions, not to mention the areas south of the Niger where pastoralists head during the dry season. The tragic destruction of Gao market, north Mali’s largest commercial center, by fire last week has got to be a final nail in the coffin for some people, even if the rains have now started there.
The April-June 2010 food security conditions across West Africa, according to FEWS net.
There are also reports that Bamako is hoarding food aid, sending only the old supplies stashed at Mopti north and keeping the rest in the south, where the crops were good last year. True or not, people report it as such in Kidal. On the other side, some southerners accuse Kidal politicians of profiting from the misery of their own people. Other reports again, more neutral, document intense efforts on all sides, facing nearly insurmountable shortages and logistic impossibilities.
So things in Mali, if they receive the international focus or not, are as bad as in areas of Niger.
In Niger many more farming communities were stricken by the start-stop rains of June 2009, and the pockets of Tillaberi, Tahoua, and Maradi Regions (mostly) have long reverted to crisis mode. Men are on extended “exode”, the dry season trips abroad for wage labor. Other communities have picked up en masse, fleeing to towns, other regions, or even to Hausa northern Nigeria, where some have trade or family contacts. Others still remain, depleting the last of their food stocks, and somehow making it on less and less each day.
"We are experiencing, like all the countries in the Sahel, a food crisis due to the poor harvest and the locust attacks of 2004," Mr Tandja said in 2005. "The people of Niger look well-fed, as you can see."
It’s important to differentiate between drought and famine (one may cause the other, or may not), and recognize that some places like parts of central Niger have suffered chronic seasonal malnutrition since the 1990s, and recurring drought caused famines since 1968. The causes are debated, and while climate change no doubt is happening, one should not discount the structural changes we have seen over the last 30 years. The IMF’s austerity policies which did such obvious damage to urban West Africa in the 1980s, and triggered much of the 1990-2 democratization wave thereafter, also had pernicious effects on rural areas. The “free trade” treaties of the 1990s — as Bill Clinton recently admitted in the case of Haitian farming — drove world commodity market forces into even the most protected rural communities. Subsidized western industrial agriculture can produce food and cash crops cheaper than most smallholders in the Sahel, but can also cause basic food prices to swing wildly on the back of market speculation, as we saw in 2008. As Marx famously said, in the face of commodification, structures, forms of productions, and traditions have no recourse. “All that is solid melts into air…”, and much of the rural economic structure of the developing worlds has so disintegrated in the last decades. Some areas might survive, sending farmers flooding into urban export driven production. For whatever reasons, Niger, like Haiti, never saw enough of this to absorb the mass of small farming which supports %80 of its people. They continue to literally scratch a living out of dusty millet fields, with less and less ability to turn to either community or markets when things go wrong.
FEWS net's projected food security situation (July-September 2010), Niger. We expect a normal harvest to come in September.
Some pastoralists in North Mali and Niger never really recovered from the loss of herds in the early 1970s. They starved in 1984 because of this, and (arguably) supported armed struggle in the 1990s in part because of this. [It's more complicated that this, with longstanding communities of grievance, and militants trained abroad, but the 72-74 drought can't be discounted]. These are as much political and economic/structural problems as environmental, and they need to be treated once this hungry season passes in September.
In Niger, as grim as this is, some things have improved. Then President Tandja (and current opposition leader Hama Amadou, as well as some “progressive” westerners, for the record) purposefully denied the food shortages and deaths in 2005 were “famine”. They were seeing severe seasonal malnutrition in limited areas, and most children were dying of malnutrition related disease rather than starvation. This is how people die in famines, but the “f” word has political connotations which were painful, and so it is better to try and trivialize the suffering of the rural poor, apparently. I hope there is a special ring of hell for such people. We are not hearing that this time, in part thanks to the Nigerien Junta. Salou Djibo can play on an oft repeated trope in Niger (1974 being the model) of military rule justified by food emergencies mishandled by corrupt civilians. I would hope those in Niamey recognizing this as famine would do the same if they had been in power last year. I also hope they target the structural causes that allow this to happen, after they face the monumentally complicated distribution of food aid.
Aid Agencies (links to give, and learn more)
Filed under Blog, Niger by T. Miles on 25 May 2010 at 4:14 pm
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- From 2005: “Drought has turned farmland into useless dirt…” Image via Wikipedia
An unsigned editorial from Le Pays (Ouagadougou): A quite good reflection on the educational and other restrictions coming for future governments in Niger, but tying the famine. The papers in Niamey have little mention of the small farmers and herders Tahoua, Tillaberi, Diffa, and the north, who are long out of food and fleeing their homes. It’s evidence both that patches of famine sit beside areas which had passable crops last year, and that Nigerien politics is often quite distant from the realities of most Nigeriens. The Burkinabe writer ascribes blame for the chronic malnutrition of Niger’s citizens to both past policies and horrible governance (which is only partly the case), while leaving us with the distinctly uncomfortable vision of Niamey debating constitutional clauses while elsewhere in Niger people are dying.
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 13 May 2010 at 4:46 pm
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The VOA today quotes PNDS-Tarayya spokesperson Iro Sani, saying that “it has been tried once (before) and it didn’t get result(s) satisfying to the people of Niger.”
He likely refers to the the 1999 CRN Junta’s ”Fourm sur la gestion économique et financiere”, led by current junta heavyweights Col. Hima (Pele) Hamadou and Gendarme Col. Lawel Chékou Koré. Their late 1999 findings were little more than perfunctory, forcing some former regime officials to repay cash. In fact, from 1974 and 1996 coups, to Tadja’s “Mains propre” campaigns against his political enemies of 2003/2007/2009, corruption prosecutions have been symbolic and purely focused on mid level Nigeriens, never the huge neocolonial funders of the dirty system. [2007's Hama Amadou ouster as PM and later prosecution was an outlier in this, and its ripples may have doomed Tandja, fatally splitting his political machine.]
Areva and China are right to be nonplussed, as opposition leaders (who really only want payback on higher ranking foes) are skeptical. We’ll see a show but little more.
Also: The court case over who is the “real” MNSD-Nassara (the former ruling party) is winding up. The party is split between Seyni Oumarou and its Tandja appointed leadership, or the former golden boy and 2007-2009 ousted leadership under Hama Amadou. Past rulings — even under the transitory 6th republic of Tandja — favored Amadou. This would be fatal to the Tandja faction, while a loss by Hama means he would run under his new MODEN party banner, which regathers his mostly western (Tillaberi/Niamey) power base.
- Général de Corps d’Armée Ali Saibou c. 1990. He was the last man to wear that rank. Image via Wikipedia
And Also:Junta leader / President of the CSRD/ Chef d’Escadron (“Major” in the anglo-saxon system) Djibo Salou got himself named “Général de Corps d’Armée”. While most of this junta’s actions have been studiously based upon the 1999 CRN junta, that government’s leader Daouda Malam Wanké remained Chef d’Escadron until civilain rule was re-established. In fact, the last time there even was a “Général de Corps d’Armée” was 1991, when Ali Saibou was overthrown, the only man to hold that rank in Niger’s history. This continues an interesting resuscitation of the Saibou regime, often portrayed as a failed reform government and place holder between the absolute rule of Seyni Kountché and the democratic revolution of 1991. Salou sought out the long retired Saibou for a public benediction upon the new coup shortly after taking power, and has appointed a large number of officials who had served under Saibou’s short lived single party Second Republic.
I would argue this has much to do with the broad popularity which the Kountché regime is hazily remembered today, at variance with the sometimes brutality of the time, which was also conflated with the uranium fueled vast economic expansion of the late 1970s.
But the accention to a frankly ridiculous title by CSRD President Djibo Salou raises questions about the previously humble and apolitical nature of his transition. We can only hope this says little about the recently agreed upon timetable of a return to civilian rule by the one year anniversary of the 18 February coup.
Filed under Blog, Mali by Tommy Miles on 22 April 2010 at 3:22 pm
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The French press is reporting that a French tourist and an Algerian guide were kidnapped by armed men today in northern Niger, near the well at In-Abangaret. Also spelled Inabangaret, it’s a stopping place on the Azzouagh plain’s Tahoua/Assamakka/Tamanrasset road. This puts it relatively near the attack of several months ago on the Tahoua/Tillia road, and within reach of the band that carried out the attack on a Tillaberi army post last month. They were traced as far as the hills of west of Tin-Essako in Mali’s northern Gao Region. While In-Abangaret doesn’t come up in the news much, it is an important seasonal gathering point for some Tuareg communities (there is a “In-Abangaret Cross” in the famed Tuareg armorial tradition), as well as being in the midst a Berabiche transhumance zone. A hand grenade attack on Algerian truckers there in 1997 caused concern, with former members of one of the Arab rebel factions blamed for running a protection racket against long haul transport.
Update 2010-04-23: There are now several press accounts of this incident, mostly pointing to speculation by unnamed Nigerien military officials, most of whom point to Malian based AQIM/bandits. The military say they will “close the border” with Mali, which is good for a chuckle. Either army would be lucky to identify the imaginary line which runs through a thousand km of desert, let alone “close” it somehow.
The AFP picked up a report that blames a group around one “Taleb Abdoulkrim”, reputedly an associate of the AQIM group of Abu Yaya Amane, himself an offshoot of Abu Zeid’s AQIM faction. Honestly, the internal workings of these groups are beyond my ken. I suggest turning to more informed sources.
One interesting factoid, Abdoulkrim is reported to have led a mosque in the tiny border town of Inhallil (a.k.a. In Hallil / Hallil / Aïn Hallil) in Mali, best known as one of two transit points into Algeria where thousands of migrants from across West Africa find themselves in a sort of purgatory, unable to cross to Bordj Badji Mokhtar in Algeria, or (more interesting in this case) dumped there by Algerian authorities.
Regardless of source, the Nigeriens seem confident these men came from Mali, but depending on reports, the actual site of the kidnapping is getting farther from both Algeria and Mali. Reuters puts the attack between In-Abangaret and Teguidda-n-Tessoumt, the salt panning settlement connected to Ingal, and closer to Agadez than Tahoua. This is also near Azelik, where the Chinese owned Société des Mines d’Azelik S.A. (SOMINA) is facing local opposition. It would also put the kidnap on the RN 11 road (really a sand piste, but a international route none the less), not on a lonelier offshoot between In-Abangaret and Tahoua, which is closer the Malian border and a place AQIM bandits have attacked previously.
I would not discount the intensifying food and livestock crisis in pastoralist northern Mali and Niger in this. It is really the much larger story going on now in this area. A European in Kidal (or even Agadez) must start to look like a walking Dollar sign to a local who is rapidly loosing their livestock to starvation, and searching for a way to feed his family. Regardless, this is big business now, and there’s no way to know if the actual kidnappers are professional smugglers, Algerian jihadists, or unemployed former rebels looking for a meal.
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 12 April 2010 at 11:05 am
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Greenpeace’s November 2009 report on radioactivity levels in the streets of Arlit and its suburb Akokan has been repeatedly denied by French nuclear company AREVA, the operator of the two nearby mines, but Greenpeace, as well as local residents, activists, and the international press, has continued to press the issue. These two mines (one underground, one open pit) provide almost half Niger’s exports by value, and their “success” is the basis for the some 150 mining contracts sold by the Tandja regime, mostly to new Canadian and Chinese companies. Locals have long complained of the pollution from the Somair and Cominak mines. Franco Nigerien group CRIIRAD, having carried out pollution studies there since 2003, found radioactivity levels 100 times background in 2007. Construction of roads and buildings was done using radioactive mine tailings, while mine dust blows across the region from Somair pit. With the entire Talak plain west of the Aïr Massif now being sold for mining, the northern seasonal pasture lands upon which pastoralism depends will soon disappear or become polluted beyond use. This has long been known, and it is good to see renewed press attention.
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 2 April 2010 at 12:15 pm
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Following court complaints lodged by lawyers for the 17 Tandja Ministers and loyalists Friday morning, Junta Interior Minister Ousmane Cissé has climbed down, stating that 14 of them "will be released" "for the sake of social peace." Tandja…
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 31 March 2010 at 1:03 pm
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Former rebel leader Rhissa Ag Boula, along with former commander Kindo Zada, were arrested today on unknown charges, and are reported to be in the Niamey civil prison. Rhissa Ag Boula is one of the most prominent, if divisive, Tuareg leaders, becoming a…
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 29 March 2010 at 8:33 pm
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The arrests I noted earlier continued Monday, with at least 13 figures being held at the Gendarmerie, including top leaders who rallied to Tandja's 6th Republic in 2009: former PM and MNSD party leader Seini Oumarou, Mohamed Ben Omar and Moktar Kassoum…
Filed under Blog, Mali by Tommy Miles on 17 March 2010 at 10:11 pm
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Jeune Afrique reports sightings of the AQIM men who attacked the Nigerien army post at Tiloa, in the far north of Tillaberi last week. Apparently the Army knew there was a chance of attack somewhere in the area, having asked for reinforcements two days…
Filed under Blog, Niger by T. Miles on 13 March 2010 at 4:40 pm
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I’ve warned that, given the poor harvests and pastures, we can expect many incidents of communal and ethnic tension across the Sahel this year. The end of the formal insurgencies in both Niger and Mali last year also leaves a residue of unemployed armed men and grudges between communities.
One example of these risks is reported in Agadez‘s “Aïr Info journal” n°108 dated this week. On page 5 is the story of an attack by armed youth from Tchi-n-Tiguit (“Tchitintagatte”, about 50km south of Arlit, coincidentally in the middle of the new AREVA Imouraren mining concession) on their neighbors at Sekkiret (“Sikirat”, about 30km west of the famous Dabous Giraffe carvings).
Earlier this week, armed young men arrived at Sekkiret, firing in the air and chasing women and children out of their homes, but left before anyone was hurt. Sekkiret youths having returned home to frightened families, set off for revenge. The paper reports it was only the intervention of two former ministers (one from each community) and the local chieftaincy which ensured security forces were quickly dispatched to calm the situation.
The cause: Sekkiret youths had reputedly harassed Tchi-n-Tiguit two years ago during the insurgency. There is no indication here of ethnicity, but that history, and the name Tchi-n-Tiguit, suggests a community of Tamasheq speakers some Tuareg caste, subgroup, or related community). Some towns in the area – like Ingall – are populated by Songhai speakers, dating back to the time when they were outposts of the Malian and Songhay Empires. Others are made up of former Tamasheq bonded communities who still bear grudges against some higher caste communities. These groups are normally peacefully intermixed, along with other groups, tribes, caste communities, and Tuareg confederations. But in times of stress, as we’ve seen from Sarajevo to Jos, people do find enemies even among neighbors.
Aïr Info concludes: “The inhabitants of these villages, brothers since time immemorial, have now become two blocs that risk, if we do not take care, of turning on each other! The state must quickly find a solution to this problem which has already gone on too long!”
Filed under Featured, Niger by T. Miles on 13 March 2010 at 1:58 am
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Junta head Salou Djibo, beside the flag of the presidency in the Presidential Palace.
As I noted on the 10th of March, the CSRD junta in Niger has replaced all the civilian Region Governors with military men to administer local affairs during the transition. We now have the full list, and while I for one hate to see any military governing, a look at the men (all men) coming and going in Niger’s Regions gives us an opportunity to examine what’s going on behind the scenes, and what it augurs for the future.
There have been several misreports — domestically and western — about these appointments. I noted that the eight military Zone Commanders had already taken on public duties of the eight indirectly elected Regional Governors. Their chiefs of administration seemed to have already taken up the practical duties, at least they behave as such in press reports.
I have hammered on about the ecumenical nature and continuity represented in the Niger Junta so far, evidence that they may well live up to their word and leave politics after a quick transition. They clearly wish to project an image as a “national” institution “above” politics. What they believe in their hearts, I can’t pretend to know, but a close look at the replacement of rater venial Regional Governors with a broad group of officers shows that the junta is at least consistently “on message”.
First, one point the press maybe getting wrong. “Contrôleur Général” Issoufou Yacouba is made Governor of Dosso Region. He’s been reported as a civilian, but given that “Contrôleur Général” is the honorific held by chief of the National Police Issoufou Yacouba, and the only other two high-ranking officials I could find with that rather common name were mid level magistrates in Niamey and Birni N’Konni, I’ll put my money of the head of the Police. Regardless, he replaces a man very associated with former President Tandja personally, Governor Issoufou Oumarou. Oumarou was an early supporter on Tandja’s dumping of the constitution and replacement of the 5th Republic with new more malleable institutions. You may remember the violence that accompanied Governor Oumarou’s decision to hold a gala gathering of the ruling party’s Dosso members in front of the Governors Palace in the middle of Dosso town. The guests had to move inside as opposition youths took to the streets, burning tyres and overturning official vehicles amid tear gas and gendarmes trying to restore order.
The eight regions of Niger, which roughly correspond to the Military's "Zones de Defense"
I earlier reported Colonel Yayé Garba was made Governor of the Niamey Capitol Region (CUN), per the press. He was actually named to head Agadez Region. He replaces Abba Malam Boukar, elected as an opposition CDS-Rahama member who was wooed into Tandja’s camp and expelled from his party in 2009. I can’t imagine he has a great political future now. The Zone Commander in Agadez, Colonel Salifou Modi was an influential military leader, member of the 99 junta (the CRN), and now is a high ranking member of the CSRD. Modi is personally close to Col. Hima Pele Hamidou one of the two of three top Junta leaders, and veteran of the 99 coup. Col. Yayé Garba was a member of the 96 coup junta whose head (President Bare Mainassara) was killed by the 99 junta, splitting some elements of the army since.
This too describes the trajectory of Col. Mahamadou Barazé, made Governor of Zinder Region, who was in the 96 junta and a Gendarmerie officer then, now he’s Army. Barazé replaces in Zinder the informal duties of Zone Commander Colonel Sidikou Issa, who was last week kicked up to head the powerful Interior Ministry paramilitary force, the FNIS. That two presumed Bare partisans are representative of a camp alienated in the military since 1999 by the man we can now safely call Tandja’s main sponsor, former Chief of Staff General Moumouni Boureïma (now still under house arrest). To have place three such men powerful posts – along with Bare Maïnassara’s former Chief of Staff who has been made Junta president Salou Djibo’s aide de camp, must be intended to heal these wounds.
Col. Mahamadou Barazé replaces in Zinder one of the most influential political barons of the MNSD-Nassara, (former) Governor Yahaya Yandaka. Yahaya Yandaka was involved in a high profile battle for influence in early 2009 with a certain villain of the Tandja drama Dan Dubai, the financial backer of Tandja’s campaign, and opposition hate figure. Yahaya Yandaka won, but he loses now. His powerful business connections in Zinder will likely see him reappear.
As an aside, Niamey papers reported last week the return to the capitol of former Commander Kindo Zada. He had reputedly been involved in the June 2000 kidnap of the Capt. Hima Hamidou, and in 2007, ran off to the Air mountains to join the mostly Tuareg insurgents of the MNJ, becoming leader of one of their two very effective TIR units. He’s likely one of the reasons the MNJ sported a picture of Bare Maïnassara on their website: Kindo Zada was a loyalist, like the troops engaged in periodic unrest in 1999 – 2002, especially the large mutiny in Diffa. His return to Niamey marks a symbolic success of the CSRD’s reconciliation strategy.
Colonel Soumana Djibo, was made Governor of Niamey (the CUN), obviously a plum job. This is especially interesting as the head of Military Intelligence Col. Soumana Djibo was without explanation arrested on the orders of the top brass in March 2009. He was released within a few weeks, but no adequate reasons for eater action were given. One rumor had it that he had attempted to uncover — or blackmail — General Boureïma over army complicity in smuggling or other crimes. The Issikta article at the time suggests this might be involved with transit of goods via AQIM. Chew on that, given the last year of events.
Colonel Sani Issa Kaché, is made Governor of Tahoua. He was military Governor of Dosso Region under the 1999 CRN junta. He replaces a pillar of both the elected Tandja governments and his 2009 “Tazartché”, Mahamadou Zéty Maïga, who had been MNSD-Nassara Governor of Tahoua Region for ten years.
Col. Sidikou Issa presides over the "Lutte" winner's award in Zinder. Just days after the coup, officers replaced regional governors.
Lt. Col. Ibrahim Bagadoma is made Governor of Tillabéri Region, replacing a member of the Baré Maïnassara party (the RDP-Jama’a) Idder Adamou. The RDP, after prevarications I have mentioned before, rallied to Tandja in 2009. Lt. Col. Bagadoma was a high ranking Gendarmerie Nationale commander under Tandja, but was an early supporter of the CSRD, traveling with their delegation to meet Algeria’s leaders in the days after the 18 February coup. Interestingly, he was named by Tandja to one of four security forces seats of the “Independent” Electoral Commission (CENI) in March 2009, after the President ejected all opposition members and packed the body with his supporters. One of the three others so named is also being named Governor today, Colonel Mohamadou Barazé. Another of the four, Colonel Soumaïla Garba, was named head of the post-coup Presidential Guard. The last, Chef d’Escadron Garba Issoufou of the Gendarmerie Nationale? I’m sure we’ll hear from soon. This demonstrates either the weakness of Tandja’s support in the Military, or the readiness they have to join the winning side.
Colonel Fodé Camara, of whom I know nothing, is made Governor of Diffa. He replaces another man who made what is now obviously a poor choice to leave an opposition party so he might retain his seat as governor under the Tandja regime, Oumarou Yacouba of the ANDP-Zaman Lahiya.
And finally we come to Colonel Garba Maïkido, made governor of the Hausa Maradi Region, at the epicenter of the 2005 famine and threatened again this year. Garba is a bit of an Army folk hero. Already a popular officer, it was said amongst the troops that in August 2008 he refused to be ‘bought in’ to Tandja’s close military supporters. When offered bribes it was reported he just walked away, a rare thing. He replaces another CDS opposition Governor who switched sides to retain his office under Tandja, Chaïbou Ali Maâzou.
I said on the evening of the coup, after seeing Pele and other high powered military men in the Junta:
I would not now be surprised to see military “insiders” like Colonel Garba Maikido, Maj [sic] Soumaila Garba, and Colonel Salifou Mody among the new junta.
As detailed earlier, Salifou Mody is head of the FNIS now, and Col. Soumaila Garba is head of the President’s Guard.
These men are truly institutional insiders. They cut across ideological, and to the degree possible on the western ethnic leaning military, all cultural differences within that institution. The naming of several men I am presuming to have been Bare Maïnassara loyalists goes some way to heal the largest split in that institution. If, as we all expect, the junta keeps to its word of recusing itself from future elections, these men will continue to be part of a more unified, likely more influential, but likely less politically partisan Nigerien institution following the return of democracy.
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 12 March 2010 at 10:19 am
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Zakou Djibo, or "Zakaï" as he is known, reappeared this week like a bad penny. Zakaï, a Zarma businessman and political funder, was at the center of the 2006 "MEBA Affair" that brought down PM Hama Amadou, along with the equally shady Himadou Hamani of "Sirignéré". Zakaï had been a powerful force under the later Baré Maïnassara regime, but reoriented after the 1999 coup, returning to earlier support he had given to Hama and the MNSD. He reappeared again last year as an influential "Tazartché" supporter of the Tandja power grab.
This week he was identified as under investigation, following an arms shipment coming into the country under his name (probably from before the coup). Now are reports he had a "offering" of several 4x4s to the new CSRD junta returned, with the suggestion he sell them to pay the back taxes he owes.
While a class maneuvre by the Army, one can't but think that power always corrupts in Nigerien politics, and when it does, Zakaï will be back!
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 8 March 2010 at 8:59 pm
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Reports are coming in of an attack by unknown assailants on the army post at Tiloa, a village around 12km from the Malian border. Several soldiers were killed. North of the more inhabited Zarmaganda plateau, Tiola is a tiny stop in the desert north of Tondikiwindi rural commune, Ouallam Department, Tillabéri Region. This is the same area in which Nigerien forces clashed with alleged AQIM members last year after a Saudi hunting party was attacked. It is west southwest of where tourists were kidnapped (likely by AQIM themselves) before that, including one Briton who was murdered. More prosaically, this area, just north of sedentary agriculture ends, is a prime smuggling location and an east-west transit route of Tuareg and Arab nomads between Gao and the Air mountains. It is also 20-30 km north of an area plagued by recurring conflict between sedentary and nomadic communities that goes back to before the 19th century.
Filed under Featured, Niger by T. Miles on 6 March 2010 at 12:22 am
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Junta leader Salou Djibo is warmly welcomed by ECOWAS chief Ibn Chambas.
In the two weeks that have passed since Niger’s Mamadou Tandja was overthrown by the army, there has been an explosion of joy an relief from Nigeriens, countered by a few, very specific, criticisms. A wire story by AFP and an analysis by Alex Thurston at SahelBlog are the two best English language assessments I’ve seen of the complexity of popular mood, now so positive but with huge expectations of the CSRD junta. This is what other journalists, apparently surprised that coups are not always seen as naked power grabs, have called “the Good Coup.”
And good it most certainly was. African commentators have reminded us that President Tandja had staged a coup of his own last June, dismissing all checks on Presidential power and ending the 1999 constitution of the 5th Republic. Tandja settled with Tuareg rebels and the French government’s uranium mine (Niger’s major source of income), pocketed 1.2 Billion Euros, and set about rebuilding the state around a small power base of leaders loyal only to him.
As we know, this worked out poorly for all involved, except perhaps France’s Areva uranium. While foreign criticism of the February 18 coup has been diplomatically correct, there is an implied wink, best exemplified by outgoing ECOWAS President Mohamed Ibn Chambas’ grin at his first meeting with junta head Cmdt. Salou Djibo.
Nigerien popular reaction, it is not to much to say, was jubilant. So much so that on March 3rd, the junta’s nightly press release included a demand that people stop having spontaneous rallies support the junta, as they were blocking too much traffic in the capital. But there has been criticism from Niger, and as differences will likely grow and not lessen during the transition, it is worth taking these few voices seriously. These complaints come from three different groups, representing different groups with different trajectories over the next six to nine months of transition. None rise to the level of righteous indignation which the pitiable citizens of Guinee turned on their junta tormentors after a year of criminality and massacre. Nigeriens will be better off with all likely outcomes of this transition than they would have been under the personal rule of Tandja and his corrupt cronies. But there are, even now, voices questioning if this is good enough.
The Losers
The most strident criticisms come from the overthrown. Tandja and his closest partisans for now remain mum, as until 5 March, five of the most powerful minister were under arrest, and the rest know that their arrests would be a popular move by the junta. Two who have spoken out are former PM Seini Oumarou as the leader of the MNSD, and his party VP Ali Sabo. Oumarou’s statement in the week after the coup, delivered in the name of the MNSD, has made him the highest profile leader to openly oppose the coup. Sabo’s statements to the press, more measured, project a party united against and illegal change of power. Both men were handpicked by Tandja to run the party, after driving out former PM and party chief Hama Amadou, and splitting many locals. Court cases about the legality of this move were still ongoing as recently as January, and it is unclear if Hama — one of the most likely post coup leaders — will now recapture the party or stick with his newly created MODEN-Lumana organization. While MNSD cadre were mixed in their reaction to the 6th Republic, Sabo and Oumarou’s statements since the coup, along with statements by crony groups like the MPDNP of Nouhou Arzika, are of a category of their own: outright rejection of the coup.
This is shared, publicly at least, only by those leaders who most closely tied their futures to Tandja. Members of four Tandja allied minor parties, who will likely be blacklisted for the time being, released statements calling the coup everything from an illegal plot by the opposition to a neo-colonial ploy by imperialists. This is not a large number of individuals, and the junta can feel safe to ignore them. But even these disparate and serially unsuccessful party leaders - Abdoulkarim Mamalo, president of PMT-Albarka, Ali “Max” Djibo of UNI – append their damnation with a call for a peaceful transition.
The loyal opposition
Cpt. Djirilla Harouna, who led the coup assault (center), is offered a RDP-Jama'a umbrella by supporters, Feb. 20, Niamey. The RDP was one of the parties whose government the coup had overthrown.
Nigerien politics are very good at providing second chances, and even those who tried to ride Tandja’s coattails know they will live to fight again. The 1999 5th Republic was even able to find space for the party of President Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, upon who’s murder that regime was based. Baré’s loyalists (his family and those who’d burned their bridges by defying the boycott of existing parties to join the coup), regrouped under the RDP-Jama’a served in Tandja’s governments, and portions supported his June 2009 coup. The RDP leadership joined Tandja’s new government, took part in his boycotted elections, and supported his 6th Republic even when Tandja made clear that the RDP’s core issue – the repeal of the amnesty for the soldiers who killed Baré – was not on the table. But within days of the coup RDP-Jama’a members were visible at rallies supporting the February 18 coup. MNSD members, whomever they supported in the split, will find a modus vivendi with whatever regime appears.
The second set of criticism, the mildest, are from the the leaders of the opposition. In this group are the inheritors of the coming political order: Marou Amadou (a civil society leader catapulted to prominence as the organizer of the broad opposition front), Hama, Mahamadou Issoufou (of the PNDS party), and the others who are girding for expected presidential elections. [To my knowledge the exiled leader of the third opposition party the CDS-Rahama, former President Mahamane Ousmane, has not given an interview since the coup]. They are publicly grateful, but insist that this be done quickly. They are the firmest backers of the coup who have expressed any criticism. It matches the foreign criticism in its proforma wording, but it is also the category most likely to grow, based as it is in impatience.
A pox on all houses
Third, and I think the most interesting, are some from the intelligentsia and civil society groups. L’Eventment’s editor saying “these are the same crooks being again chose to serve the interim administration” is a notion which may have legs in the long term. Issoufou Sidibe of the influential CDTN trade union confederation may, after his initial critique of the “quality” of the junta ministers, come to that conclusion as well. From the leaders of the political class, this last criticism is that “we wanted all Tandja’s people to pay for what they did” position. From people on the street it is the much more revolutionary desire to purge the entire, failed, political leadership of the nation. That same desire was tapped by Tandja’s supporters, who argued that a Tandja dictatorship would save the nation from all the “politicians”. To completely ignore this line of criticism would be foolish.
A variation on this critique of the transition is a critique of the need for a interim government at all. The head of the University Teachers union, which was paralyzed by divisions in the 6th republic, released a strong statement saying essentially “there needs to be another National Conference” as in the 1991 transition from military dictatorship to democracy: such changes need to be decided beyond the political class’s leadership. Other opposition supporters have complained that they were fighting for the return to the 5th Republic, not for an elite to create a whole new one.
While the crux of the 2009 political crisis was the greed of one small group around the President, the entire Nigerien political class has time and again shown itself unable to work together on any national development, and equally guilty of looting the treasury when they come to office. This is the most potentially potent critique of the new Junta’s plans. But a thorough housecleaning is unlikely to be in the cards, and most everyone knows that.
The Military and the opposition leadership are seemingly agreed that the 1999 constitution was in part to blame for Tandja’s ability to take power, with approbation of unilateral actions by the executive, but no means for enforcement against the executive. This, they say, needs to be reworked in a 7th Republic. The model for doing so exists from 1999, where leaders of all the parties sat down to rewrite the basic structure of government, then approved by referendum.
Every sign so far is that today’s junta is modeled closely upon Wanke’s 1999 CRN junta and transition. The knock on 1999 is threefold. They returned the same corrupt political class to power. An improvement from Bare, but not great for the masses. They were entirely undemocratic during the transition. They set up a cycle of the Army as guarantor of political peace. We have begun to hear the first and last complaints already. We will likely hear more of all three.
Is there still a 1991 option?
One caveat: Junta leader Cmdt. Salou Djibo and Prime Minister Danda have both pulled in a lot of people with ties to the Ali Saibou regime of the late 1980s. This was, in fact, where Danda had his first political appointment. They both made high profile visits to General Saibou’s home, something unseen for many years. This may be that he is the latest icon of the “good soldier” in an army still divided by April 1999 assassination of General Baré. Or it may be that he’s the only living head of state not involved in the current crisis.
Or, one might hope, it is a willingness to diverge from 1999 script, and open the process to the popular forces seen in the 1991 National Conference. This was a transition to democracy controlled not by the government, but by civil society and a wide range of political and union groups, where the army was willing to take a backseat to more popular forces. The prospect of such a transition in 2010 may be idealistic, but it remains a home.
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 4 March 2010 at 1:21 pm
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Niger's state paper reports a preliminary meeting of Ministers were given instruction by the Junta Head of State Cmdt. Salou Djibo on Wednesday (3 March). A "Secretary General" of the Council was named: Mrs. Adama Saliah Gazibo. The report describes her as a Judge, which she is. But she was also one of the chief officials of former PM Hama Amadou, the once scion of Tandja who later became his arch foe. Hama is seen by some conspiratorially minded as the backer of this coup. Adama Saliah Gazibo's appointment won't help this. She is also the official who famously attempted to discredit the slavery testimony of a Nigerienne Mariama Oumarou's at the 2001 Durban racism conference. About the girl, who was married at 15 to a Nigerian by her Tuareg noble master and used as a servant and raped, Saliah said a Niger court "found that the girl's marriage was legitimate under traditional law. This girl should not come here and disgrace her country when the legal process has done its work."
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 3 March 2010 at 2:01 pm
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Mahaman Laouali Dan Dah, who was appointed by the CSRD junta on Monday as Minister of Secondary Education, has also been appointed spokesman for the new provisional government. Laouali Dan Dah is an interesting character: a gadfly under the Bare regime, he led the Magistrates union SAMAN (syndicat autonome des magistrats du Niger), and was nominated for the CENI electoral commission. After the April 1999 coup he served as Justice Minister, and has since run his own law firm in Niamey. More generally, Laouali Dan Dah seems a representative – if particularly distinguished – member of the provisional government. These are technocratic professionals who have a record of opposing the worst excesses of Nigerien regimes, but have no qualms about working with all other political poles of the society.
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 2 March 2010 at 2:25 pm
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Libération-Niger reports that three security heads were freed from custody: Col. Hamidou Maïgari, head of the 600 man Presidential Guard under Tandja was freed along with a Captain of the same unit. Both were held at Camp Bagagi Iya, best known for the football stadium where the FNIS and Army teams play. The later is headed by junta no 2 Col. Pele Hima Mamadou, coincidentally or not.
As noted earlier, Army Colonel Abdou Sidikou Issa was just transferred to head the FNIS (which commands the Guard). The former FNIS head Colonel Assoumane Abdou remained loyal to Tandja, and is one of only a handful of top commanders to have disappeared from the scene. Most others previously seen as close to Tandja have rallied to the new Junta. Liberation also points out that Col. Bagué, Tandja's Aide de camp (and conflated in some earlier reports with CSRD Secretary Col. Abdoulaye Badie), was released by the junta several days earlier.
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 2 March 2010 at 1:57 pm
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I've argued that continuity and inclusiveness is the watchword of the new CSRD junta in Niger. Some additional appointments announced today underscore this. Disgraced Tandja Military chief and co-conspirator General Moumouni Boureïma's aide Col Abdou Sidikou Issa is one of the main field commanders to rise from the 99 coup. He was Prefect of Maradi in 99, chief of the Zinder Defence Zone at the beginning of the recent Tuareg conflict, and moved in the highest army circles. He's now been named as the head of the FNIS the paramilitary force of the Interior Ministry, which also runs the Presidential Guard. Général de Brigade Seyni Garba, one of the four Joint Chief generals thought loyal to Tandja and Boureima (along with Mai Manga Oumara, Abdou Kaza, and Mamadou Ousseini, now all Ministers) is Inspector General of the Gendarmerie. Pele Hima Hamadou, presumed Junta no. 2, is made Counselor to the President with Rank of Minister: so technically that's six officers now ministers.
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 2 March 2010 at 1:57 pm
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Like many nations, Nigeriens make a distinction between "political" figures and "National" figures. Of course this distinction is artificial and changeable: deposed President Tandja tried to position himself as "above" politics, as a justification for taking dictatorial powers, and see where that got him. But one of the most interesting re-appearances of the last few weeks is former President-Général (1987-1991/3) Ali Saibou. At the time he was the weak consensus candidate after the death of Seyni Kountché, hard man of the 1974-1991 military Junta. He vacillated about democracy, oversaw a brief bloody crackdown on dissent, and then gave up meekly to a citizens council and stayed on as a figurehead for two years. Living in obscurity, he has been visited by both the coup leaders and the PM in recent days, who hold him up as "a chief of state who loved Niger". With the other living ex-heads of state (Ousmane and Tandja) still active politically, Saibou seems sainted.
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 2 March 2010 at 12:13 pm
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While Monday's announcement kicked three long standing generals up to provisional ministers, the junta in Niger has named the new joint chiefs, with continuity to the fore (again). Those how moved up to ministerial positions were replaced by their adjutants. Air Corps General Souleymane (Seyni) Salou, one of the four officers favored by Tandja, is now Joint Chief, with the only obvious political casualty of the coup former joint Chief Général de Division Moumouni Boureima still under arrest. With Gen. Mamadou Ousseini a Minister, his adjutant Col. Salifou Mody (Modi) is head of the Army. He's another member of the Junta and member of the 99 junta. Air Col. Hassane Mossi, the former adjutant becomes head of Air Forces. He too is on the CSRD junta. Their assistants are previously anonymous Colonels Didili Amadou (to the Chief), Iro Oumarou (Army), and Issa Hamza (air). Note that Gen Seyni Salou, for having been bought off by Tandja, now appears beside Djibo Salou in meetings.
Filed under Blog, Niger by Tommy Miles on 1 March 2010 at 11:13 pm
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The CSRD Junta has named (1 March) a provisional government of 20 ministers. Apart form President Salou Djibo, there are five military men all from the highest levels, including Generals Mamadou Ousseini, Mai Manga Oumara, Abdou Kaza who were just below Tandja's Military Chief Boureima, and considered loyalists to that regime. They are joined by Colonels Ahmed Mohamed and Diallo Amadou who were members of Wanke's 1999 junta. Their five portfolios make this the most military officers in a government since Gen. Ali Saibou's 11 March 1991 government, the last prior to democratization. The only other new Minister (other than PM Danda) to have served at this level: Minister of Education Dan Dah, who was Justice Minister under Wanke. Of the less known remaining, five are women, the most of any Nigerien government. Only time will tell if these civilian ministers hold powerful posts past the transition, or are influential over the junta.
As I noted on the 10th of March, the CSRD junta in Niger has replaced all the civilian Region Governors with military men to administer local affairs during the transition. We now have the full list, and while I for one hate to see any military governing, a careful look at the men (all men) coming and going in Niger's Regions gives us an opportunity to examine what's going on behind the scenes, and what it augurs for the future.
More ...
Nigeriens were - are - undoubtedly pleased that the army stepped in to end a newly installed dictatorship. But criticisms of this so called "good coup" are beginning to appear even amongst its strongest supporters. With many months of transitional rule ahead, these whispers give us some idea of the problems the junta will soon face. 
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