Jeune Afrique reports sightings of the AQIM men who attacked the Nigerien army post at Tiloa, in the far north of Tillaberi last week. Apparently the Army knew there was a chance of attack somewhere in the area, having asked for reinforcements two days…

It has been 6 days since (on 10 March) the a variety of formal and informal unions of Malian inter-city truck drivers went on strike, shutting down the transport of people and goods. While Bamako/Koulikoro and points northwest are served by rail from Dakar…

Faure Gnassingbé, understandably pleased.

Jeune Afrique editor François Soudan has a biting new piece on the recent Togolese election. Noting defeated opposition candidate Jean-Pierre Fabre’s neologism “Africaneries” (for “African Inherited rule”, presumably) Soudan turns the tables of blame deftly.

“For African oppositions, some of whom, in Guinea and Niger, have been reduced to military coups to break political deadlocks – which says a lot about their disarray – the lesson of Lomé is a cruel one. As long as opposition leaders contest polls without program, and act without strategy or self-criticism, the powers that be will sleep soundly. Resigned, disillusioned and unwilling to serve as canon fodder for the powerful, the voters will more and more the “exit option” of abstention. As for Faure Gnassingbé, he received on March 4 that which he sought. A brand new legitimacy, given neither to his party nor to his family nor to his surname, but to him. Without doubt he would do well in his next speech, to thank Mr. Olympio [the historic leader of the opposition] for the assistance he has so kindly provided … “

State paper Le Sahel reported the rather extraordinary scenes at the Foreign Ministry in Niamey on Saturday, as representatives of all political faction were invited to begin the discussion of a new constitutional process which will return Niger to democratic rule. While the article reports little but the lecture given by Junta head Cmdt. Salou Djibo, photos and universally positive reaction quotes suggest that this process has been de facto recognized by most every political organization in the country.

Former Tandja PM Seyni Oumarou, the head of the (former) ruling MNSD-Nassara party was seated next to onetime ally Sanoussi Jackou of PNA-Al'Ouma and the RDP-JAMA'A leader. Bazoum Mohamed, VP of the main opposition PNDS sat along with CDS-Rahama chair Mahamane Ousmane, surrounded by leaders of allied parties, albeit across the auditorium from the Tandja men. Notable absence: former PM Hama Amadou and PNDS head Mahamadou Issoufou, the two men likely to be the next President.

This is the argument Louisa Lombard, an Anthropologist doing fieldwork in the Central African Republic, toys with. And she makes some very good points: the state there helps no one outside Bangui: “Life expectancy in CAR drops by six months each year”; “Everything [inducing most foodstuffs] is imported”; “residents complain of the discrimination they face from the faraway central government, which labels them Chadian or Sudanese and therefore sub-standard citizens”; even that it was never intended to be a nation “Barthelemy Boganda, never thought that it could be a tenable country on its own, and he chose the anodyne name it now bears in hopes that it would facilitate joining forces with the rest of Central Africa to become a federation”.

Of course this won’t happen anytime soon. The CAR will just remain an open sore until there is some massive change in the political class or their internal chaos starts interfering with resource extraction and more stable neighbors. And so it will go on.

Related links

• What can a humanitarian response offer the Central African Republic? (one.org)
• UPDATE 1-Central African Republic to hold April 25 elections (af.reuters.com)
• Sunday Africa Blog Roundup: Sudan and the ICC, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, al Shabab and Somali Pirates, Nas and Damian Marley (sahelblog.wordpress.com)
• Sunday Africa Blog Roundup: Somalia, Sudan, DRC, Swiss Minarets (sahelblog.wordpress.com)

Image by Getty Images via Daylife

The French press initially reported midday Sunday (14 March, local time) that the Central African Republic government had foiled plans for a coup attempt, set to take place between the 15th and the 20th. No one does coups quite like Bangui, usually with the French government pulling the strings: they’ve had a lot of practice. Jules Bernard Ouanda, the Minister of National Security and Public Order, recorded an announcement for Radio Centrafrique, passed on to the press, and since confirmed.

Ouanda claims that on Friday, the government of President François Bozizé obtained a “Plan of Action” made by the coup plotters, whom they refused to name, but described as “several political and military figures.” Ouanda red from a detailed plan: a “special form” dated March 8, subtitled “Preparations for coup from the period from March 15 to 20.” The government notations on the plan describe it as (according to a brief glimpse by reporters) “hatched by elements KAMIKAZE commandos, mercenaries, militias and expatriates in the pay of former President Ange-Félix PATASSE” Ouanda repeatedly refused to name names, but did read a portion of the “plan” that included orders to “reinforcement elements in the home of AFP.”

Reporters also spoke with former President Ange-Félix Patassé who in his thirty years of political leadership has been more than once a coup plotter, like current President Bozizé who ousted the President Patassé on 15 March 2003. Patassé told reporters “I phoned the minister. He told me that it was not me” who was blamed for the coup plan. He added that he expected it still might be an attempt to “eliminate” him from the scheduled 12 and 23 April two round Presidential elections.

Another such rival, Charles Massi was a Minister under both Patassé and Bozizé, in 2008 left political life to become the respectable front on the northeastern CPJP. When I first saw report in the CAR expat press and on the CPJP website around Xmas saying he was “kidnapped in Chad and turned over to the CAR”, I assumed this was infighting or overreaction. I was wrong. Sometime around January 9, Massi was tortured to death by the CAR government in Bossembele prison, a fact which the government admitted last month.

Lord preserve the CAR from political leaders, near and far.  It brings to mind a Brecht poem a friend of mind often repeats:

Empires collapse.
Gang leaders Are strutting about like statesmen. The peoples
Can no longer be seen under all these armaments.

See Also:  Centrafrique: When a neocolony collapses (17 December 2009)

More:

• Call for CAR rebel torture probe (news.bbc.co.uk)
• CAR president confirms rebel leader’s death (af.reuters.com)
• Central African Republic: Keeping the Dialogue Alive (crisisgroup.org)
• Sunday Africa Blog Roundup: Sudan and the ICC, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, al Shabab and Somali Pirates, Nas and Damian Marley (sahelblog.wordpress.com)
• UPDATE 1-Central African Republic to hold April 25 elections (af.reuters.com)

I’ve warned that, given the poor harvests and pastures, we can expect many incidents of communal and ethnic tension across the Sahel this year. The end of the formal insurgencies in both Niger and Mali last year also leaves a residue of unemployed armed men and grudges between communities.

One example of these risks is reported in Agadez‘s “Aïr Info journal” n°108 dated this week. On page 5 is the story of an attack by armed youth from Tchi-n-Tiguit (“Tchitintagatte”, about 50km south of Arlit, coincidentally in the middle of the new AREVA Imouraren mining concession) on their neighbors at Sekkiret (“Sikirat”, about 30km west of the famous Dabous Giraffe carvings).

Earlier this week, armed young men arrived at Sekkiret, firing in the air and chasing women and children out of their homes, but left before anyone was hurt. Sekkiret youths having returned home to frightened families, set off for revenge. The paper reports it was only the intervention of two former ministers (one from each community) and the local chieftaincy which ensured security forces were quickly dispatched to calm the situation.

The cause: Sekkiret youths had reputedly harassed Tchi-n-Tiguit two years ago during the insurgency. There is no indication here of ethnicity, but that history, and the name Tchi-n-Tiguit, suggests a community of Tamasheq speakers some Tuareg caste, subgroup, or related community). Some towns in the area – like Ingall – are populated by Songhai speakers, dating back to the time when they were outposts of the Malian and Songhay Empires. Others are made up of former Tamasheq bonded communities who still bear grudges against some higher caste communities. These groups are normally peacefully intermixed, along with other groups, tribes, caste communities, and Tuareg confederations. But in times of stress, as we’ve seen from Sarajevo to Jos, people do find enemies even among neighbors.

Aïr Info concludes: “The inhabitants of these villages, brothers since time immemorial, have now become two blocs that risk, if we do not take care, of turning on each other! The state must quickly find a solution to this problem which has already gone on too long!”

Zakou Djibo, or "Zakaï" as he is known, reappeared this week like a bad penny. Zakaï, a Zarma businessman and political funder, was at the center of the 2006 "MEBA Affair" that brought down PM Hama Amadou, along with the equally shady Himadou Hamani of "Sirignéré". Zakaï had been a powerful force under the later Baré Maïnassara regime, but reoriented after the 1999 coup, returning to earlier support he had given to Hama and the MNSD. He reappeared again last year as an influential "Tazartché" supporter of the Tandja power grab.

This week he was identified as under investigation, following an arms shipment coming into the country under his name (probably from before the coup). Now are reports he had a "offering" of several 4x4s to the new CSRD junta returned, with the suggestion he sell them to pay the back taxes he owes.

While a class maneuvre by the Army, one can't but think that power always corrupts in Nigerien politics, and when it does, Zakaï will be back!

(Via GUINEA OYE!) Africom commander Kip Ward announced US National Guard units (once designed to defend the US from invasion, build infrastructure, and provide disaster aid in their states) are being “paired up” with African nations, in some kind of bizarre military “Adopt a child” program.

As is now usual, a set of real, exaggerated, and imagined African problems are trotted out to convince both sides Africans need to let the US military bases there. Now that there’s oil.
Says “Kip”: “Current National Guard pairings in Africa are: California with Nigeria; Michigan with Liberia; New York with South Africa; North Carolina with Botswana; North Dakota with Ghana; Utah with Morocco; Vermont with Senegal; and Wyoming with Tunisia.” “Conflict, violent extremism, narcotics trafficking, piracy, disease and economic development are among issues Africom tackles on the continent.” “Enhancing the capacity of African forces … allows the United States to use its forces for other operations…”

The official order to replace up the eight regional governors with military governors came today from the CSRD. This is no surprise: it was noted shortly after the coup that all official appearances were being done by the Commanders of each of the Zones de Defense, which match up to the Regions. I have not seen the official list, but the reports of the Zinder and Agadez governors practical replacements were previously published here. The interesting announcement, Colonel Yaye Garba was named governor for Niamey, obviously an important post. Garba was a member of the 1996 junta, but not the 1999 transition, presumably due to personal or factional loyalty to Gen. Bare Mainassara, killed by the 1999 coup. His appointment demonstrates both the elite continuity and ecumenical openness of the regime. Also note, the actual work of governing has, since the coup, been in the hands of the General Secretaries of the regions, the highest ranking civil servants. Expect this to continue.

I.S. Gaoh of LE TEMOIN argues that the just announced scaling back of Areva's Imouraren mine schedule shows that backers of the coup (Hama Amadou?) were part of an agreement that AREVA would get a better uranium deal if Tandja was overthrown. This is built on the false assumption that what Tandja said about his deal was accurate, that it was some sort of hardball defense of Niger's interests (a portion of the ore to be sold on the market by Niger, more Nigerien staff). When in fact, the real hardball was likely more cash upfront to Tandja, on top of the 1.2 billion Euros upfront announced. Since the details are not public, we'll never know, unless the CSRD releases them, as they are unlikely to do. This would embarrass Areva (ergo, the French government) and likely mean Niger would have to repay the money Tandja took.

Gaoh then says that the junta must break the deal now, and go after China or other neocolonial patrons to break France's grip before the next (corrupt) government.

I.S. Gaoh of LE TEMOIN argues that the just announced scaling back of Areva's Imouraren mine schedule shows that backers of the coup (Hama Amadou?) were part of an agreement that AREVA would get a better uranium deal if Tandja was overthrown. This is built on the false assumption that what Tandja said about his deal was accurate, that it was some sort of hardball defense of Niger's interests (a portion of the ore to be sold on the market by Niger, more Nigerien staff). When in fact, the real hardball was likely more cash upfront to Tandja, on top of the 1.2 billion Euros upfront announced. Since the details are not public, we'll never know, unless the CSRD releases them, as they are unlikely to do. This would embarrass Areva (ergo, the French government) and likely mean Niger would have to repay the money Tandja took.

Gaoh then says that the junta must break the deal now, and go after China or other neocolonial patrons to break France's grip before the next (corrupt) government.

Philomena Kabour, the Burkina-Italian wife of Sergio Cicala, kidnapped near in Mauritania was released, along with Alicia Gamez, one of three Catalan aid workers kidnapped north of Nouakchott. All appear to have been taken to a AQIM camp in the remote Saharan north of Mali. Roque Pascual and Albert Vilalta (the Catalans kidnapped November 29) and Cicala (kidnapped December 18) remain hostage. There is no word on what was exchanged. Burkina authorities were the intermediaries for Kabour's release.

AFP re-reports the allegations of two Catalan journalists, now safely home. They say that they were threatened with kidnapping and delivery to Al-qaeda by the Mayor of Gao, Sadou Harouna Diallo (don’t ask me why AFP put an extra “a” in his name).

Diallo is a well know character, the owner of the successful Tizimizi hotel chain, business man, and regular kingpin on the Commune urbaine de Gao. He ran his 2009 campaign on the slogan “Yes We Can,” while never missing an opportunity to associate himself with the American soldiers in town to train Mali special forces.

He’s also the one that the Malians arrested by the US in November for drug-running named as their “connection” for transit (not drugs) in the region. He famously caused a big stink in the area in 2009 when he abandoned his post as SG of the ADEMA-PASJ ruling party, then ran his slate to victory in 7 0f the 10 seats of the local council as independents linked to the “Mouvement Cityoen”: a group that hopes to underwrite more power for the “non-partisan” President of Mali.

I can’t imagine he’d have anything to hide from nosiy foreign reporters. Or have anything to do with people disappearing.

Unidentified armed men attacked a truck carrying goods and passengers on the Niger river road from Gao to Ansago on Monday. The truck’s driver was killed, several wounded, and the bandits made off with cash and property. This was somewhere between 100 and 200 km west northwest of the attack on a Nigerien military post that same morning, and more than 300 km south of the carjacking of two aid workers near Kidal last week. See my comments on the carjacking for a summary of what I think is going on (short answer guns + poverty + demobed insurgency + corruption = crime). Please leave your Bin Laden fantasies at the door.

Follow up: (2010-03-13)

An anonymous commentator on the Kidal.info message board poses these details: “The attack is locally attributed to Peul individuals. The truck is owned by Ely Ould Hennoun an Arab trader who resides in Bamako. A young Arab died (the driver) and a Tuareg who accompanied him was seriously wounded in the head. … The killers stole two Thuraya satellite phones and the small sum of about 25,000 FCFA [~ 38 Euros]… This at the cost of two lives.”

I haven’t the vaguest clue if the ethnic insinuations are true, and it would be sad should the Gao-ites be overly concerned about ethnic identity in this sort of crime. But it speaks to the general insecurity and the desperate straits of northern Mali, that someone would kill for a handful of goods. It certainly doesn’t suggest that everyone there is flush with drug money.

Reports are coming in of an attack by unknown assailants on the army post at Tiloa, a village around 12km from the Malian border. Several soldiers were killed. North of the more inhabited Zarmaganda plateau, Tiola is a tiny stop in the desert north of Tondikiwindi rural commune, Ouallam Department, Tillabéri Region. This is the same area in which Nigerien forces clashed with alleged AQIM members last year after a Saudi hunting party was attacked. It is west southwest of where tourists were kidnapped (likely by AQIM themselves) before that, including one Briton who was murdered. More prosaically, this area, just north of sedentary agriculture ends, is a prime smuggling location and an east-west transit route of Tuareg and Arab nomads between Gao and the Air mountains. It is also 20-30 km north of an area plagued by recurring conflict between sedentary and nomadic communities that goes back to before the 19th century.

The headlines from Lomé, Togo are tension inducing. For Togolese or those with family there, it must be excruciating.

It appears that President and dictator’s son Fauré Gnassingbé has been elected with government reporting 1,243,044 versus 692,584 votes for nearest rival Jean-Pierre Fabre of the UFC. Official turnout was 2,119,829 (~%64), so the 5 opposition parties netted only 877,785.

But their leaders have cried foul, saying votes were bought, the satellite reporting system was fixed, and voters were intimidated. Fabre declared victory right after the vote, even threatening to name a provisional government. Combined opposition marches in Lome were twice attacked by police this weekend, with members tear gassed, HQ barricaded by soldiers, while Fabre vowed struggle: “We will launch a popular uprising until victory is ours.”

Meanwhile ECOWAS has praised the vote, mostly thanks to Faure Gnassingbé backer and President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré. The EU, which had 200 observers, claims to have no evidence of vote fraud. But they do note that in the north, Gnassingbé’s father’s region, Fuare’s people were passing out gifts, including quarter price rice. Other reports counted a 16 to 1 number of RPT posters in Lome, an opposition strong hold. UFC charges that their voters feared a repeat of 2005, where the army literally hunted down and killed those suspected of supporting the opposition. This is likely true, but neither of these tactics change the vote numbers. The RPT has used everything available to buy and bully the vote, and they have succeeded. ECOWAS or EU failure to factor in this is criminal. The EU even helped to create a special Togolese paramilitary police unit (the FOSEP) to “protect” the vote. This despite the long suspicion that Gnassingbé the younger is a puppet of elements within the security forces. I’m sure some stirring EU powerpoint presentations were provided, but that hardly changes the balance of forces.

The fact is, postcolonial rulers have gotten very good at fixing ‘free’ elections in Africa, passing the muster of democracy in a proforma fashion, while retaining real power. When the opposition makes a stick, this can pass quickly, or create instability which can fester for decades. Will this end like Gabon? Or Niger? Or — God help us — Cote d’Ivoire.

Links

• TogoSite, a diaspora news source has the most up to date information
• To see results from the ground check out togoelection2010.com. It uses the Ushahidi platform, developed a a sms reporting hub during the 2007 Kenya violence.
• This AP wire story from this morning is quite evocative of the mood in Lome’s opposition circles: Opposition claims fraud in Togo’s vote, vows fierce protest
• The French government is one of the few that has as yet not recognized Faure as winner. They took a bit of wait on Ali Bongo’s 2009 contested win in Gabon. That election is the best parallel – so far – to what is happening in Togo.
• ModernGhana.com reports “Provisional results give Faure Gnassingbe Victory with wide margin”
• IRIN news from Saturday: “Disputed vote spawns fears”
• From the African Elections Project (in Accra): A report on the new united opposition organization “Front républicain pour l’alternance et le changement” (Frac), which includes the UFC, the OBUTS of Agbéyomé Kodjo, and smaller paries such as Maurice Dahuku Péré‘s ALLIANCE. “Le Frac exige la libération des ses militants arrêtés“
• Burkina’s Fasozine reports, Le Togo a encore raté le virage! (Togo has again missed its turn), saying in part

“The actions and protests announced by the opposition are evidence of an electoral malaise. Undoubtedly, Togo has, once again, missed its opportunity for a presidential election with results that would appease, not create more controversy. They have obviously not found the remedy to the evil that has plagued the country since the winds of democracy which blew across nations of West Africa in the 1990s. Curiously, it [Togo] is the only place, since then, where elections results have always been questionable. It is also the only country in West Africa where the same regime in power since 1963. Wouldn’t this explain it?”

• Fasozine wraps up the first CENI approved results, giving them in full:

“1- Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé of the Rassemblement du peuple togolais, (1243044 votes, 61%)
2- Jean-Pierre Fabre of l’Union des forces du changement (692 584 votes, 34%)
3- Yaowi Agboyibo of Comité d’action pour le renouveau (60 388 votes, 2,96%)
4- Kodjo Agbéyomè of l’Organisation pour bâtir dans l’union un Togo solidaire (17 397 votes)
5- Brigitte Kafui Adjamagbo Johnson : Convention démocratique des peuples africains, the only woman in the race (13 451 votes).
6- Bassabi Kagbara : Parti démocratique panafricain (8 357 votes)
7- Nicolas Lawson : Parti du renouveau et de la rédemption (6 029 votes)”

• Afrol News reports Fears of violence after Togo elections. After making clear how polarized Togo is right now, they conclude:
  “Meanwhile, the Togolese government is preparing to consolidate its announced victory in several ways. In central Lomé, at strategic places and outside UFC headquarters, barricades are already in place to stop demonstrators and to control their movements. Armed forces are surrounding UFC headquarters, hindering the opposition from organising marches. Second, propagation of President Gnassingbé’s victory is running on top gear. Media – most of which are state-controlled – are making it clear Mr Fabre was thoroughly defeated, by democratic means of course. ‘
• Afriquejet reports: Togo’s opposition candidate to name Prime Minister
• South Africa’s News 24 warns: “Togo opposition protest looms”.

The Canadian run Samira Hill mine near the Niger/Burkina border reports two new expansions. Pres. Tandja received the first gold bar in 07, and apparently signed big deals in 2009, of which this is fruition. SEMAFO CEO Benoit La Salle: "The Samira Horizon remains an important mining district for SEMAFO, hence our decision earlier this year to proceed with a two-year $6,000,000 exploration program on the property…. We are encouraged by these new discoveries at Samira Hill, the results of which may become part of our reserves and resources base and ultimately extend mine life. We believe that our continued exploration programs to fully define the property will ultimately benefit from existing infrastructures and contribute to increase value for our shareholders." It would be interesting to see the full contracts signed with the Tandja government, and where that cash went, and to see if any went to protect the nearby W Transboundry Park from the arsenic pools used to process ore.

A Dakar based corespondent for Kenya’s Nation paper reports says that Nigerien activists have set up camp at French government uranium miners AREVA‘s Niamey offices. There is as of yet no independent confirmation of this, or if they are occupying the offices. The name given in the report is “Areva ne fera pas la loi au Niger” (“Aveva is not the law of Niger”) This same slogan is used by Tuareg activists of the Tchinaghen collective of Agadez, as well as French anti-neocolonial campaigners Suivre. Activists have long tried to draw attention to the horrible radioactive pollution, the awful working conditions, and the neocolonial exploitation of the huge open pit mines in the Arlit area of the Nigerien Sahara. These provide %40 of the fuel for France’s nuclear power industry, upon which they are dependent for electricity.

See these websites for more on activism against the French exploitation of Niger’s resources:

http://www.tchinaghen.org/
http://areva.niger.free.fr/
http://www.survie-paris.org/

Togo is holding a presidential election today. Success, according to the international community, will be if the army does not butcher voters and soldiers are not photographed running from polling stations with voting boxes under their arms. While these may seem low standards, that was the 2005 election, in which Faure Gnassingbé the son of a 38 year dictator, was jobbed into power by the army after his father’s death, and thousands fled the country. Today’s outcome is foregone. The main opposition candidate, son of the first President of Togo whom Faure’s father murdered, was excluded from running. A relative unknown, Jean Pierre Fabre, was chosen in his stead, rumored to have been pushed by the government itself. While the ruling RPT is divided too (Faure’s brother, Kpatcha had much party support before being arrested in 2009), this is a single round election facing five members of what one candidate himself called the “most stupid and criminal opposition in the sub-region.”

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• Togo hopes for more peaceful poll (news.bbc.co.uk)
• Ballot fraud row simmers in Togo (news.bbc.co.uk)
• Suspense as state of Togo vote unclear (seattletimes.nwsource.com)

"Norbert" in Niamey's "Le Courrier" paper has interesting piece on the ineffectiveness of Tandja's Interior Minister Abouba Albadé. Albadé, a Tandja-ist of the first water served briefly as PM and importantly headed up the police and internal paramiltary (FNIS) services. He was one of the men most associated with Tandja's power grab. While the author refers to Albadé's well funded "Gestapo", the fall of the President suggests those funds may have gone somewhere other than for intelligence. Le Courrier repeats rumors that Albadé was getting 120,000 Euros a year directly from Tandja. When PM Ali Gamatie (on whom the writer hangs the Hausa slur "Bak'in Bature" : essentially "an Uncle Tom") tried to cut the funds, Albadé went over his head to keep them. The piece ends with a bizarrely obscure Diderot quote from his 1769 harangue against Frederick II ("Pages contre un tyran"), saying that when power praise "truth" while lying, people may only yearn for truth even more. True?