It’s beautiful in New York, and the world if full of things to argue about. Here are three important issues I’ll have to get back to you on.
While the world goes to hell in a handbasket, I have been trying to maintain my sanity with light reading, and sunny days on the back patio. This largely precludes the production of good (or even mediocre) writing. Further political catastrophes and World Cup drama could completely rule it out.
Despite that, there are several things which should appear here soon, plus a reading recommendation. Advice for further reading and different perspectives is always very welcome.
First, I’m working on a close reading of the latest US / West African drug arrests, this time focused on Liberia. Not to sound too paranoid, but these things never seem to hang together well when examined closely, and I’ve come to believe over the last few years that there is a commonality of interests between several right wing think tanks, a clutch of journalists and “terrorism experts”, UN Anti-Drug authorities, foreign governments, military, and local governments which play up the need for military and legal spectacle at the expense of actual work on development or ending corruption. While there is likely some real criminality going on in this case, I’m prepared to argue that this Liberian sting of aspiring West African drug runners serves more to allow these interests to further very specific political agendas.
Most important to me, I’ve finally thoroughly read Dutch historian Baz Lecocq‘s 2002 dissertation, “That Desert is Our Country’: Tuareg rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996).“ As it is available online, I had read later chapters when I’d seen it cited some time ago. But having stormed through from the start, I must say that it is the best thing written on the Malian Tuareg in English (easily) and arguably better than anything in French (to be fair, I’m thinking only of articles I’ve read by Georg Klute, the Bernuses, Claudot-Hawad, and Bourgeot. I haven’t read Pierre Boilley’s “Touaregs Kel Adagh”, let alone Georg Klute’s ”Die Rebellionen der Tuareg in Mali und Niger”, which I’ve only ever seen in German). With very few changes it could be produced as a very valuable book.
Lecocq’s basic premise – which he candidly admits was not the one he began with – is that French colonialism and the process of independence heightened a pre-existing “racial” prejudice between northern and southern communities in what is today Mali, even when outsiders might be unable to easily distinguish between these groups. Independence, as well as French and upper class Tuareg resistance to the form this independence, only deepened these divisions, reinforcing mistrust on all sides, keeping these communities at daggers drawn. This has played out through profound reordering in the structures and meanings of the notoriously complex and shifting Tuareg social/political order on one side. On the other, the brutality and hamfistedness of southern politicians and military has often exacerbated conflict, frustrating Malian society. Nine of ten Malian live in the south, and these communities, having paid dearly to create the imperfect economic development and political liberties they now enjoy, have little sympathy with Tuareg demands.
If you’re anglophone and interested in French colonialism in the Sahara, Mali’s first decades of independence, the current “Tuareg problem”, or even the more general history of cultural conflict along the interface of the Sahel, there’s tremendous value in this work. Admittedly, Lecocq really focuses on the history of “free” clans of Tuareg in (what is now) Kidal Region’s Adagh des Ifoughas, who make up only a portion of the population of even this limited area. But their politics and culture are central to the 1963, 1990, and 2006/7 rebellions, and all north south relations in Mali. Without understanding this, I’ve always found the causes of fighting there hard to understand, even in relation to the Nigerien Tuareg rebellions, which seem much more enmeshed in Niger’s politics and culture.
A herd, starved to death, in North Mali. These animals represent many years of saved wealth and future investment for Malian pastoralists.
Hopefully by now everyone knows that parts of West Africa, especially pockets of Chad and Niger, are struggling with the worst food shortages since 2005. Alex Thurston reports that international humanitarian agencies, as well as increasingly concerned governments, are now worried that this crisis is more generalized than first reported (last September), striking areas of Mauritania and Mali.
In Mali, there is a crisis in the north (mostly Kidal Region) right now, with press reports of huge numbers of animals lost to the mostly pastoralist residents. As in Niger, prices for forage have skyrocketed, prices for animals have plummeted, so that recent reports have talked of Malians trading female goats – the future of their herds – for a single bag of rice in Algerian border markets. Malian press reports talk of traveling through rural Kidal last week, counting corpse after corpse of starved livestock, the very source of pastoralist livelihoods. Those that can have moved south, increasing the pressure on pasture and farm land, surely also risking more communal tension. Kidal Region is already rife with armed unemployed men, competing smuggling rings, and simmering tribal vendettas. The overflow from this must add sparks to the already smoldering Tombuctu and Gao Regions, not to mention the areas south of the Niger where pastoralists head during the dry season. The tragic destruction of Gao market, north Mali’s largest commercial center, by fire last week has got to be a final nail in the coffin for some people, even if the rains have now started there.
The April-June 2010 food security conditions across West Africa, according to FEWS net.
So things in Mali, if they receive the international focus or not, are as bad as in areas of Niger.
In Niger many more farming communities were stricken by the start-stop rains of June 2009, and the pockets of Tillaberi, Tahoua, and Maradi Regions (mostly) have long reverted to crisis mode. Men are on extended “exode”, the dry season trips abroad for wage labor. Other communities have picked up en masse, fleeing to towns, other regions, or even to Hausa northern Nigeria, where some have trade or family contacts. Others still remain, depleting the last of their food stocks, and somehow making it on less and less each day.
"We are experiencing, like all the countries in the Sahel, a food crisis due to the poor harvest and the locust attacks of 2004," Mr Tandja said in 2005. "The people of Niger look well-fed, as you can see."
It’s important to differentiate between drought and famine (one may cause the other, or may not), and recognize that some places like parts of central Niger have suffered chronic seasonal malnutrition since the 1990s, and recurring drought caused famines since 1968. The causes are debated, and while climate change no doubt is happening, one should not discount the structural changes we have seen over the last 30 years. The IMF’s austerity policies which did such obvious damage to urban West Africa in the 1980s, and triggered much of the 1990-2 democratization wave thereafter, also had pernicious effects on rural areas. The “free trade” treaties of the 1990s — as Bill Clinton recently admitted in the case of Haitian farming — drove world commodity market forces into even the most protected rural communities. Subsidized western industrial agriculture can produce food and cash crops cheaper than most smallholders in the Sahel, but can also cause basic food prices to swing wildly on the back of market speculation, as we saw in 2008. As Marx famously said, in the face of commodification, structures, forms of productions, and traditions have no recourse. “All that is solid melts into air…”, and much of the rural economic structure of the developing worlds has so disintegrated in the last decades. Some areas might survive, sending farmers flooding into urban export driven production. For whatever reasons, Niger, like Haiti, never saw enough of this to absorb the mass of small farming which supports %80 of its people. They continue to literally scratch a living out of dusty millet fields, with less and less ability to turn to either community or markets when things go wrong.
FEWS net's projected food security situation (July-September 2010), Niger. We expect a normal harvest to come in September.
Some pastoralists in North Mali and Niger never really recovered from the loss of herds in the early 1970s. They starved in 1984 because of this, and (arguably) supported armed struggle in the 1990s in part because of this. [It's more complicated that this, with longstanding communities of grievance, and militants trained abroad, but the 72-74 drought can't be discounted]. These are as much political and economic/structural problems as environmental, and they need to be treated once this hungry season passes in September.
In Niger, as grim as this is, some things have improved. Then President Tandja (and current opposition leader Hama Amadou, as well as some “progressive” westerners, for the record) purposefully denied the food shortages and deaths in 2005 were “famine”. They were seeing severe seasonal malnutrition in limited areas, and most children were dying of malnutrition related disease rather than starvation. This is how people die in famines, but the “f” word has political connotations which were painful, and so it is better to try and trivialize the suffering of the rural poor, apparently. I hope there is a special ring of hell for such people. We are not hearing that this time, in part thanks to the Nigerien Junta.Salou Djibo can play on an oft repeated trope in Niger (1974 being the model) of military rule justified by food emergencies mishandled by corrupt civilians. I would hope those in Niamey recognizing this as famine would do the same if they had been in power last year. I also hope they target the structural causes that allow this to happen, after they face the monumentally complicated distribution of food aid.
From 2005: “Drought has turned farmland into useless dirt…” Image via Wikipedia
An unsigned editorial from Le Pays (Ouagadougou): A quite good reflection on the educational and other restrictions coming for future governments in Niger, but tying the famine. The papers in Niamey have little mention of the small farmers and herders Tahoua, Tillaberi, Diffa, and the north, who are long out of food and fleeing their homes. It’s evidence both that patches of famine sit beside areas which had passable crops last year, and that Nigerien politics is often quite distant from the realities of most Nigeriens. The Burkinabe writer ascribes blame for the chronic malnutrition of Niger’s citizens to both past policies and horrible governance (which is only partly the case), while leaving us with the distinctly uncomfortable vision of Niamey debating constitutional clauses while elsewhere in Niger people are dying.
I’ve warned that, given the poor harvests and pastures, we can expect many incidents of communal and ethnic tension across the Sahel this year. The end of the formal insurgencies in both Niger and Mali last year also leaves a residue of unemployed armed men and grudges between communities.
Earlier this week, armed young men arrived at Sekkiret, firing in the air and chasing women and children out of their homes, but left before anyone was hurt. Sekkiret youths having returned home to frightened families, set off for revenge. The paper reports it was only the intervention of two former ministers (one from each community) and the local chieftaincy which ensured security forces were quickly dispatched to calm the situation.
The cause: Sekkiret youths had reputedly harassed Tchi-n-Tiguit two years ago during the insurgency. There is no indication here of ethnicity, but that history, and the name Tchi-n-Tiguit, suggests a community of Tamasheq speakers some Tuareg caste, subgroup, or related community). Some towns in the area – like Ingall – are populated by Songhai speakers, dating back to the time when they were outposts of the Malian and Songhay Empires. Others are made up of former Tamasheq bonded communities who still bear grudges against some higher caste communities. These groups are normally peacefully intermixed, along with other groups, tribes, caste communities, and Tuareg confederations. But in times of stress, as we’ve seen from Sarajevo to Jos, people do find enemies even among neighbors.
Aïr Info concludes: “The inhabitants of these villages, brothers since time immemorial, have now become two blocs that risk, if we do not take care, of turning on each other! The state must quickly find a solution to this problem which has already gone on too long!”
Junta head Salou Djibo, beside the flag of the presidency in the Presidential Palace.
As I noted on the 10th of March, the CSRD junta in Niger has replaced all the civilian Region Governors with military men to administer local affairs during the transition. We now have the full list, and while I for one hate to see any military governing, a look at the men (all men) coming and going in Niger’s Regions gives us an opportunity to examine what’s going on behind the scenes, and what it augurs for the future.
I have hammered on about the ecumenical nature and continuity represented in the Niger Junta so far, evidence that they may well live up to their word and leave politics after a quick transition. They clearly wish to project an image as a “national” institution “above” politics. What they believe in their hearts, I can’t pretend to know, but a close look at the replacement of rater venial Regional Governors with a broad group of officers shows that the junta is at least consistently “on message”.
First, one point the press maybe getting wrong. “Contrôleur Général” Issoufou Yacouba is made Governor of Dosso Region. He’s been reported as a civilian, but given that “Contrôleur Général” is the honorific held by chief of the National Police Issoufou Yacouba, and the only other two high-ranking officials I could find with that rather common name were mid level magistrates in Niamey and Birni N’Konni, I’ll put my money of the head of the Police. Regardless, he replaces a man very associated with former President Tandja personally, Governor Issoufou Oumarou. Oumarou was an early supporter on Tandja’s dumping of the constitution and replacement of the 5th Republic with new more malleable institutions. You may remember the violence that accompanied Governor Oumarou’s decision to hold a gala gathering of the ruling party’s Dosso members in front of the Governors Palace in the middle of Dosso town. The guests had to move inside as opposition youths took to the streets, burning tyres and overturning official vehicles amid tear gas and gendarmes trying to restore order.
The eight regions of Niger, which roughly correspond to the Military's "Zones de Defense"
I earlier reported Colonel Yayé Garba was made Governor of the Niamey Capitol Region (CUN), per the press. He was actually named to head Agadez Region. He replaces Abba Malam Boukar, elected as an opposition CDS-Rahama member who was wooed into Tandja’s camp and expelled from his party in 2009. I can’t imagine he has a great political future now. The Zone Commander in Agadez, Colonel Salifou Modi was an influential military leader, member of the 99 junta (the CRN), and now is a high ranking member of the CSRD. Modi is personally close to Col. Hima Pele Hamidou one of the two of three top Junta leaders, and veteran of the 99 coup. Col. Yayé Garba was a member of the 96 coup junta whose head (President Bare Mainassara) was killed by the 99 junta, splitting some elements of the army since.
This too describes the trajectory of Col. Mahamadou Barazé, made Governor of Zinder Region, who was in the 96 junta and a Gendarmerie officer then, now he’s Army. Barazé replaces in Zinder the informal duties of Zone Commander Colonel Sidikou Issa, who was last week kicked up to head the powerful Interior Ministry paramilitary force, the FNIS. That two presumed Bare partisans are representative of a camp alienated in the military since 1999 by the man we can now safely call Tandja’s main sponsor, former Chief of Staff General Moumouni Boureïma (now still under house arrest). To have place three such men powerful posts – along with Bare Maïnassara’s former Chief of Staff who has been made Junta president Salou Djibo’s aide de camp, must be intended to heal these wounds.
Col. Mahamadou Barazé replaces in Zinder one of the most influential political barons of the MNSD-Nassara, (former) Governor Yahaya Yandaka. Yahaya Yandaka was involved in a high profile battle for influence in early 2009 with a certain villain of the Tandja drama Dan Dubai, the financial backer of Tandja’s campaign, and opposition hate figure. Yahaya Yandaka won, but he loses now. His powerful business connections in Zinder will likely see him reappear.
As an aside, Niamey papers reported last week the return to the capitol of former Commander Kindo Zada. He had reputedly been involved in the June 2000 kidnap of the Capt. Hima Hamidou, and in 2007, ran off to the Air mountains to join the mostly Tuareg insurgents of the MNJ, becoming leader of one of their two very effective TIR units. He’s likely one of the reasons the MNJ sported a picture of Bare Maïnassara on their website: Kindo Zada was a loyalist, like the troops engaged in periodic unrest in 1999 – 2002, especially the large mutiny in Diffa. His return to Niamey marks a symbolic success of the CSRD’s reconciliation strategy.
Colonel Soumana Djibo, was made Governor of Niamey (the CUN), obviously a plum job. This is especially interesting as the head of Military Intelligence Col. Soumana Djibo was without explanation arrested on the orders of the top brass in March 2009. He was released within a few weeks, but no adequate reasons for eater action were given. One rumor had it that he had attempted to uncover — or blackmail — General Boureïma over army complicity in smuggling or other crimes. The Issikta article at the time suggests this might be involved with transit of goods via AQIM. Chew on that, given the last year of events.
Colonel Sani Issa Kaché, is made Governor of Tahoua. He was military Governor of Dosso Region under the 1999 CRN junta. He replaces a pillar of both the elected Tandja governments and his 2009 “Tazartché”, Mahamadou Zéty Maïga, who had been MNSD-Nassara Governor of Tahoua Region for ten years.
Col. Sidikou Issa presides over the "Lutte" winner's award in Zinder. Just days after the coup, officers replaced regional governors.
Lt. Col. Ibrahim Bagadoma is made Governor of Tillabéri Region, replacing a member of the Baré Maïnassara party (the RDP-Jama’a) Idder Adamou. The RDP, after prevarications I have mentioned before, rallied to Tandja in 2009. Lt. Col. Bagadoma was a high ranking Gendarmerie Nationale commander under Tandja, but was an early supporter of the CSRD, traveling with their delegation to meet Algeria’s leaders in the days after the 18 February coup. Interestingly, he was named by Tandja to one of four security forces seats of the “Independent” Electoral Commission (CENI) in March 2009, after the President ejected all opposition members and packed the body with his supporters. One of the three others so named is also being named Governor today, Colonel Mohamadou Barazé. Another of the four, Colonel Soumaïla Garba, was named head of the post-coup Presidential Guard. The last, Chef d’Escadron Garba Issoufou of the Gendarmerie Nationale? I’m sure we’ll hear from soon. This demonstrates either the weakness of Tandja’s support in the Military, or the readiness they have to join the winning side.
Colonel Fodé Camara, of whom I know nothing, is made Governor of Diffa. He replaces another man who made what is now obviously a poor choice to leave an opposition party so he might retain his seat as governor under the Tandja regime, Oumarou Yacouba of the ANDP-Zaman Lahiya.
And finally we come to Colonel Garba Maïkido, made governor of the Hausa Maradi Region, at the epicenter of the 2005 famine and threatened again this year. Garba is a bit of an Army folk hero. Already a popular officer, it was said amongst the troops that in August 2008 he refused to be ‘bought in’ to Tandja’s close military supporters. When offered bribes it was reported he just walked away, a rare thing. He replaces another CDS opposition Governor who switched sides to retain his office under Tandja, Chaïbou Ali Maâzou.
I would not now be surprised to see military “insiders” like Colonel Garba Maikido, Maj [sic] Soumaila Garba, and Colonel Salifou Mody among the new junta.
As detailed earlier, Salifou Mody is head of the FNIS now, and Col. Soumaila Garba is head of the President’s Guard.
These men are truly institutional insiders. They cut across ideological, and to the degree possible on the western ethnic leaning military, all cultural differences within that institution. The naming of several men I am presuming to have been Bare Maïnassara loyalists goes some way to heal the largest split in that institution. If, as we all expect, the junta keeps to its word of recusing itself from future elections, these men will continue to be part of a more unified, likely more influential, but likely less politically partisan Nigerien institution following the return of democracy.
Junta leader Salou Djibo is warmly welcomed by ECOWAS chief Ibn Chambas.
In the two weeks that have passed since Niger’s Mamadou Tandja was overthrown by the army, there has been an explosion of joy an relief from Nigeriens, countered by a few, very specific, criticisms. A wire story by AFP and an analysis by Alex Thurston at SahelBlog are the two best English language assessments I’ve seen of the complexity of popular mood, now so positive but with huge expectations of the CSRD junta. This is what other journalists, apparently surprised that coups are not always seen as naked power grabs, have called “the Good Coup.”
And good it most certainly was. African commentators have reminded us that President Tandja had staged a coup of his own last June, dismissing all checks on Presidential power and ending the 1999 constitution of the 5th Republic. Tandja settled with Tuareg rebels and the French government’s uranium mine (Niger’s major source of income), pocketed 1.2 Billion Euros, and set about rebuilding the state around a small power base of leaders loyal only to him.
As we know, this worked out poorly for all involved, except perhaps France’s Areva uranium. While foreign criticism of the February 18 coup has been diplomatically correct, there is an implied wink, best exemplified by outgoing ECOWAS President Mohamed Ibn Chambas’ grin at his first meeting with junta head Cmdt. Salou Djibo.
Nigerien popular reaction, it is not to much to say, was jubilant. So much so that on March 3rd, the junta’s nightly press release included a demand that people stop having spontaneous rallies support the junta, as they were blocking too much traffic in the capital. But there has been criticism from Niger, and as differences will likely grow and not lessen during the transition, it is worth taking these few voices seriously. These complaints come from three different groups, representing different groups with different trajectories over the next six to nine months of transition. None rise to the level of righteous indignation which the pitiable citizens of Guinee turned on their junta tormentors after a year of criminality and massacre. Nigeriens will be better off with all likely outcomes of this transition than they would have been under the personal rule of Tandja and his corrupt cronies. But there are, even now, voices questioning if this is good enough.
The Losers
The most strident criticisms come from the overthrown. Tandja and his closest partisans for now remain mum, as until 5 March, five of the most powerful minister were under arrest, and the rest know that their arrests would be a popular move by the junta. Two who have spoken out are former PM Seini Oumarou as the leader of the MNSD, and his party VP Ali Sabo. Oumarou’s statement in the week after the coup, delivered in the name of the MNSD, has made him the highest profile leader to openly oppose the coup. Sabo’s statements to the press, more measured, project a party united against and illegal change of power. Both men were handpicked by Tandja to run the party, after driving out former PM and party chief Hama Amadou, and splitting many locals. Court cases about the legality of this move were still ongoing as recently as January, and it is unclear if Hama — one of the most likely post coup leaders — will now recapture the party or stick with his newly created MODEN-Lumana organization. While MNSD cadre were mixed in their reaction to the 6th Republic, Sabo and Oumarou’s statements since the coup, along with statements by crony groups like the MPDNP of Nouhou Arzika, are of a category of their own: outright rejection of the coup.
This is shared, publicly at least, only by those leaders who most closely tied their futures to Tandja. Members of four Tandja allied minor parties, who will likely be blacklisted for the time being, released statements calling the coup everything from an illegal plot by the opposition to a neo-colonial ploy by imperialists. This is not a large number of individuals, and the junta can feel safe to ignore them. But even these disparate and serially unsuccessful party leaders - Abdoulkarim Mamalo, president of PMT-Albarka, Ali “Max” Djibo of UNI – append their damnation with a call for a peaceful transition.
The loyal opposition
Cpt. Djirilla Harouna, who led the coup assault (center), is offered a RDP-Jama'a umbrella by supporters, Feb. 20, Niamey. The RDP was one of the parties whose government the coup had overthrown.
Nigerien politics are very good at providing second chances, and even those who tried to ride Tandja’s coattails know they will live to fight again. The 1999 5th Republic was even able to find space for the party of President Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, upon who’s murder that regime was based. Baré’s loyalists (his family and those who’d burned their bridges by defying the boycott of existing parties to join the coup), regrouped under the RDP-Jama’a served in Tandja’s governments, and portions supported his June 2009 coup. The RDP leadership joined Tandja’s new government, took part in his boycotted elections, and supported his 6th Republic even when Tandja made clear that the RDP’s core issue – the repeal of the amnesty for the soldiers who killed Baré – was not on the table. But within days of the coup RDP-Jama’a members were visible at rallies supporting the February 18 coup. MNSD members, whomever they supported in the split, will find a modus vivendi with whatever regime appears.
The second set of criticism, the mildest, are from the the leaders of the opposition. In this group are the inheritors of the coming political order: Marou Amadou (a civil society leader catapulted to prominence as the organizer of the broad opposition front), Hama, Mahamadou Issoufou (of the PNDS party), and the others who are girding for expected presidential elections. [To my knowledge the exiled leader of the third opposition party the CDS-Rahama, former President Mahamane Ousmane, has not given an interview since the coup]. They are publicly grateful, but insist that this be done quickly. They are the firmest backers of the coup who have expressed any criticism. It matches the foreign criticism in its proforma wording, but it is also the category most likely to grow, based as it is in impatience.
A pox on all houses
Third, and I think the most interesting, are some from the intelligentsia and civil society groups. L’Eventment’s editor saying “these are the same crooks being again chose to serve the interim administration” is a notion which may have legs in the long term. Issoufou Sidibe of the influential CDTN trade union confederation may, after his initial critique of the “quality” of the junta ministers, come to that conclusion as well. From the leaders of the political class, this last criticism is that “we wanted all Tandja’s people to pay for what they did” position. From people on the street it is the much more revolutionary desire to purge the entire, failed, political leadership of the nation. That same desire was tapped by Tandja’s supporters, who argued that a Tandja dictatorship would save the nation from all the “politicians”. To completely ignore this line of criticism would be foolish.
A variation on this critique of the transition is a critique of the need for a interim government at all. The head of the University Teachers union, which was paralyzed by divisions in the 6th republic, released a strong statement saying essentially “there needs to be another National Conference” as in the 1991 transition from military dictatorship to democracy: such changes need to be decided beyond the political class’s leadership. Other opposition supporters have complained that they were fighting for the return to the 5th Republic, not for an elite to create a whole new one.
While the crux of the 2009 political crisis was the greed of one small group around the President, the entire Nigerien political class has time and again shown itself unable to work together on any national development, and equally guilty of looting the treasury when they come to office. This is the most potentially potent critique of the new Junta’s plans. But a thorough housecleaning is unlikely to be in the cards, and most everyone knows that.
The Military and the opposition leadership are seemingly agreed that the 1999 constitution was in part to blame for Tandja’s ability to take power, with approbation of unilateral actions by the executive, but no means for enforcement against the executive. This, they say, needs to be reworked in a 7th Republic. The model for doing so exists from 1999, where leaders of all the parties sat down to rewrite the basic structure of government, then approved by referendum.
Every sign so far is that today’s junta is modeled closely upon Wanke’s 1999 CRN junta and transition. The knock on 1999 is threefold. They returned the same corrupt political class to power. An improvement from Bare, but not great for the masses. They were entirely undemocratic during the transition. They set up a cycle of the Army as guarantor of political peace. We have begun to hear the first and last complaints already. We will likely hear more of all three.
Is there still a 1991 option?
One caveat: Junta leader Cmdt. Salou Djibo and Prime Minister Danda have both pulled in a lot of people with ties to the Ali Saibou regime of the late 1980s. This was, in fact, where Danda had his first political appointment. They both made high profile visits to General Saibou’s home, something unseen for many years. This may be that he is the latest icon of the “good soldier” in an army still divided by April 1999 assassination of General Baré. Or it may be that he’s the only living head of state not involved in the current crisis.
Or, one might hope, it is a willingness to diverge from 1999 script, and open the process to the popular forces seen in the 1991 National Conference. This was a transition to democracy controlled not by the government, but by civil society and a wide range of political and union groups, where the army was willing to take a backseat to more popular forces. The prospect of such a transition in 2010 may be idealistic, but it remains a home.
In a scrum of reporters Saturday, Col. Djibrilla “Pele” Hima Hamidou found himself on familiar ground. The voice of the 1999 coup leaders, Hima Hamidou read out all the statements in the days following 9 April 1999, appealing for calm and promising a speedy return to civilian rule. Last Saturday, following a meeting the leaders of the military “Conseil Suprême pour la Restauration de la Démocratie” with ECOWAS and UN officials, the armor commander and sometime football federation president again appealed for the world to trust the Nigerien military. “In 1999 we had a similar situation and we gave power back and we had 10 years of stability. We are going to do the same thing.”
The first extensive communique from the new CSRD junta in Niger was read out on local radio Monday night, and is now available in the state controlled newspaper, Le Sahel. It lays out in some detail the structure of Niger’s government during the period of military rule. If the junta is to be believed, and most Nigeriens do seem to believe them, the transition will be short. It explicitly takes as its model the Council for National Reconciliation (Conseil de Réconciliation Nationale CRN) of the 1999 coup against Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, himself a coup leader who ended a constitutional crisis, but then decided to name himself President. After almost three years of protest, boycott, strike, and crisis, Nigerien armed forces took power on 9 April 1999. They quickly called a constitutional council and referendum which produced the 18 August 1999 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, and handed over to elected President Mamadou Tandja in December 1999.
Cmd. Daouda Mallam Wanke led the fourteen member CRN, which included several members from the current junta. The number two (or three, depending on your view) in the CSRD Col. Abdoulye Adamou Harouna was Wanke’s Aide-de-camp during the process. He’s now head of the elite ECOWAS fast reaction force, and was one of the most senior officers in the pre-coup army. One of his two brothers, all sons of a leader of the 1974 coup, is the senior paratroop officer who we saw hailed by crowds this Saturday. Appearing at an opposition rally at the Rond Point de Concentration in front of the National Assembly building on Saturday, Capt. Djibrilla Adamou Harouna promised a speedy end to military involvement. Captain Hima Hamidou from the CRN rose under Tandja to become a Colonel of the elite armored brigade and head of both the Army Football club (ASFAN), the Nigerien Football Federation, and now is near the summit of the CSRD. The heads of the eight “Zones de defense nationale”, the operational commanders of the military, all appear to be on board with the junta: Pele was head of the Niamey zone, the most important for obvious reasons. In the cases of Zinder and Agadez the Zone chiefs — invariably Colonels in a military with few Generals — seem to have directly supplanted the powerful regional governors of the former ruling party, the MNSD-Nassara. Although there is as yet to official list, other junta leaders include Colonel Ibrahim Wali Karingama, a former Fenifoot associate of Pele’s and a former head of the President’s security; General Abdou Kaza who until Thursday the Defense Adviser to President Tandja until yesterday. While the President of the CSRD, Cmdt.. Salou Djibo was a low profile officer in charge of the supply units in Niamey (and the heavy weapons store), Daouda Mallam Wanke was of the same rank on 8 April 1999. So some media reports that the junta is made up of “unknown” or “minor” officers are woefully inaccurate.
The second dubious assumption being made is that Niger, having had four coups in its history, is just experiencing its inevitable return to military “strongmen”. Niger has had more than its share of authoritarian rulers, both in and out of uniform. But in its more recent history, the military has shown an increasing reluctance to rule. Individual military men such as deposed chief of staff General Boureima spent much of the last ten years exercising considerable influence over the Nigerien government, but they did so behind the scenes, as part of patronage networks which led to the apex of the civilian state. The example of Baré Maïnassara, whose reign ended on 8 April in his brutal death, probably concentrated minds as well.
President Tandja, himself a Colonel who rose to State Security minister under the 1974 coup, reached his highest summit as one of the handful of political princes only after he retired. With him were a host of ex-military officers whose connections clearly paid off better out of uniform. Tandja’s eight month “Sixth Republic” might be best seen as the culmination of this politics, with elites personally tied to the head of state pushing out all other members of the political class. Any institutions which did not lead back to the President, in classic authoritarian form, were modified to do so after Tandja dismissed the opposition last June and wrote his own constitution last August. The fate former PM Hama Amadou, pushed out by his former mentor Tandja in 2007, can be seen as one more step in this process which had been going on for some time: the removal of networks of patronage other than those which culminated in President and his family (I’m thinking especially of Tandja’s wife Hadjia Laraba Tandja, whose activities we may hear much more about should her husband come to trial).
Cmd. Daouda Malam Wanké, 1999 as President of the CRN
In contrast to the muddle and confusion of the last year of civilian political crisis, the CRN junta’s coup of April 1999 was remarkable for its speed and continuity. I want to be careful here. Some observers, especially in Niger, have all but sainted Daouda Mallam Wanke as a selfless savior of democracy. The CRN had no qualms about suppressing dissent, closing down the press, and making sure they had a piece of the coming government. Junta number two General Boureima’s great power in the Tandja government dates from this period. But the most obvious example is the CRN’s non-negotiable demand that the 1999 constitution contain a clause granting blanket amnesty to the military for the events of the coup.
It is this provision, incidentally, which doomed the constitutional extension of Tandja’s mandate after the accepted two terms. A provision placed the basic structure of the executive, along with the military amnesty, under a clause which prevented any revision by any means. Hence Tandja did not, as reported by some, “revise” the constitution. He was not able to. He unilaterally terminated the constitution under powers which allowed the President to suspend it temporarily in times of emergencies such as invasions or civil wars, and then started a new one which better suited him.
But for all their faults, the CRN was never a naked grab for power. The former PM, Ibrahim Hassane Mayaki, was retained by the CRN throughout the transition, as were most ministers. In May, a month after the coup, the CRN had appointed a broad group of politicians and civil society leaders as a Technical Committee to sketch the outlines of a new constitution. The next month, they formed an 80 member civilian Constitutional Committee to write an actual text. When infighting ensued after the committee recommended the creation of hundreds of posts for politically connected individuals, the CRN stepped in and endorsed a draft that was closest to the Third Republic Constitution. The 1992 Constitution of the Third Republic was the result of the most democratic and open process in Niger’s modern history, the year long National Conference which followed a popular revolt against military rule. With this decided, a referendum approved the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in July and it was promulgated in August. The CRN had also re-formed the Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), a bedrock institution of the 1991-92 National Conference which had been fatally compromised by Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara following his 1996 coup. The 60 member CENI had members of all the political parties, including very small ones, and including those of the regime the CRN had just overthrown. In August, the CRN and the major candidates agreed to postpone the elections a month as parties reformed and wrangled over leadership. The presidential elections took place in two rounds on 17 October and 24 November, with parliamentary elections simultaneous with the second round. After Tandja’s victory in the second round, Wanke handed over the government on 23 December 1999.
So the 1999 experience, which the 2010 leaders say they wish to replicate, is one marked by continuity and reconciliation amongst the class of the the political elite. Nigeriens are watching today’s events with that template, and those expectations, in mind.
The contents of the first long communique on government structure, Monday’s “Communiqué du Secrétariat Général du gouvernement”, and the nominations of officials to go with it, conform to the 1999 model and flesh out the specifics of the CSRD regime. First the appointments.
The communique is not signed by a military officer, but by Larwana Ibrahim, as “Secrétaire Général du gouvernement”. Larwana was Adjunct Secretary General of Government — essentially the administrative director for the head of government — from 2000, and was moved into the top spot after the previous head, Lawal Kader, left office on the heels of deposed Prime Minister Hama Amadou in July 2007. Larwana Ibrahim, incidentally, signed the decree by Tandja Mamadou which dissolved the Parliament last June, setting off this crisis. Osmane Mahaman, named Director of the Cabinet of the President of the CSRD, was Administrative director of the last three PM’s of the Tandja regime: from the lukewarm Tandja-ist Seyni Oumarou, to the fiery loyalist (if temporary) PM Albadé Abouba, to the technocratic if corrupt Ali Badjo Gamatié.
Alkaly Alhassane is named as Assistant Director of the Cabinet of the President of the CSRD. Described in the release as a sociologist, he might be better know for having been “Conseiller spécial du Premier Ministre” under PM Hama Amadou in 2000 and having been DG of Niamey’s transit system (what there is of it), the Société des transports urbains Niamey, last year.
The actual communique sets out the government which will rule the nation during the as yet undefined transition period, in much the same terms as a constitutional document. Like the CRN, the CSRD is no democratic institution. It is formally run by the President of the CSRD, whose word is absolute, and whose right to appointment and rule is presumed. Perhaps troubling, the high courts, which Tandja dissolved and reconstituted as puppet institutions after June 2009, are again dissolved and named by the CSRD President. The junta acknowledges no check on its power. But this too is identical to 1999.
The reviled press board, the CSC, is also dissolved and replaced with the National Observatory of Communication (ONC), a name last used when the body was dissolved and reformed during the 1999 rule of the CRN. A once independent body with members chosen by press and civil society groups, the CSC has been transformed by Tandja into a press censorship board, as it had been under Baré Maïnassara. The names of the courts, and all the other institutions created in this decree are identical to those created by the CRN.
Finally, a body is created to draft a new constitution, as yet unnamed, which will then be approved or rejected by referendum. Again, identical to the 1999 process.
All this is not to say the the CSRD will actually abide by the process established in 1999. They have nearly absolute power and great popularity. But the opposition bodies that came out to celebrate this past Saturday in front of the National Assembly have released their own statements in the past days. The opposition front Coordination des Forces pour la Démocratie et la République (CFDR), as well as the civil society groups and trades unions within it, and the large and activist NGO coalition “RODADDHD”, have all made statements with the same theme. They thank and celebrate the CSRD, but demand that democratic rule must return quickly, completely, and transparently.
The junta says they share this vision, and if recent history is a guide, there will be a democratic government in Niger on 1 January 2011. But no one should yet take their eyes of what may be a difficult process for which the past may not fully prepare the people of Niger.
Notice of the General Secretariat of Government: President of CSRD signs two decrees.
The President of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy, Chef d’Escaudron SALOU DJIBO, yesterday signed two decrees making appointments. Thus, under the first decree, Mr. Ousmane Mahaman, Administrative Director, was appointed Chief of Staff to the President of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy.
- Finally, under the second decree, Mr. Alkaly Alhassane, sociologist, was appointed Chief of Staff Deputy Chairman of Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy.
COMMUNIQUE OF THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT
22 February 2010
The Head of State has signed a decree on the organization of government during the transition period
The President of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy, Chef d’Escaudron SALOU DJIBO, signed Monday, February 22, 2010, an order on the organization of government during the transition period.
Under this order:
The government of Niger is a republic. Being so, it reaffirms its commitment to the principles of the rule of law and pluralist democracy.
Recognizing its responsibility to the people of Niger, the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy ensures the preservation of national unity and social cohesion.
It assures everyone equal before the law irrespective of sex, social origin, racial, ethnic or religious background.
It also guarantees the rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the African Charter on Human Rights and Societies of 1981.
It guarantees the restoration of the democratic process operated by the Nigerien people.
All rights and duties are retained conforming to the above the laws and regulations.
The government of Niger is and remains bound by international treaties and agreements previously signed and duly ratified.
The Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD) is vested with legislative and executive powers until the establishment of new democratic institutions.
The Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD) is the supreme arbiter of policy and direction of the nation.
It is headed by a President who serves as Head of State and Head of Government.
The President of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD) by order appoints a Prime Minister and other members of the transitional government.
The President may end to their functions in the same manner.
The President of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy is the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
He signs all orders and decrees.
He makes all civil and military appointments.
The President of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy may delegate certain powers to the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister leads and coordinates government action in accordance with guidelines established by the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy.
There shall be created, in place of the dissolved Supreme Court [Dissolved by Tandja after ruling against him last May, reconfigured as a Presidential appointed court], a State Court [Cour D'Etat] whose composition, powers and functions shall be determined by order of President of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy.
There shall be created, in place of the dissolved Constitutional Court [under the 5th Republic, an ad hoc body of senior legislators, reformed into a presidential appointed court last August], a Constitutional Committee whose composition, powers and functions shall be determined by order of President of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy.
There shall be created, in place of the dissolved High Council for Communication (CSC) [a once independent body, transformed by Tandja into a press censorship board], a National Observatory of Communication (ONC), whose composition, powers and functions shall be determined by order of President of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy.
There shall be created, under the authority of the President of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy, a body responsible for preparing the basic texts of the Republic, including the Constitution and the Electoral Code. The name, composition and powers of this body will be established by ordinance.
The above mentioned draft Constitution will be adopted by the Nigerien people by referendum.
Following a period to be determined by the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy, this and other transitional institutions will establish new [permanant] democratic institutions.
A schedule of the various political deadlines will be made public by the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD).
"Cri inacheve?": Adamou Idé's first book of poetry from 1984.
Adamou Idé is no slouch. An acclaimed poet and novelist, Adamou left his Niamey home to study in the Sorbonne and return to Africa as a government official and to work internationally for La Francophonie. A progressive, he authored the Labor Code used under the Third Republic which followed the overthrow of the military dictatorship in 1991. But since winning the nation’s highest poetry prize in 1981, he is best known for writing less dry documents. His poetry, both in French and Zarma, was first collected in published form in 1984, and he has written several volumes of poems, three novels, adapted writing for screenplays, and even penned politically satirical short stories in Zerma that are used in Niger’s schools. Its title “Wa sappe ay se!” is Zarma for “Vote for Me!”
There’s little in English about or by him, but his 2005 appearance at the Medellin Festival of Literature brings us one of his poems, translated into English. The poem, “J’ai Peur” (“I’m Scared”) is a sparse, hard indictment of the general, the dictator, and the presidents everywhere in this world today, who crush the joy from our lives because of their own fear of our power. One of the festival’s amazing collection of African poets reading their works, shows Adamou reading this.
I’m Scared!
I’m scared!
Yes, I do not conceal it from you
I say it: I’m scared!
I’m scared
Of all anthems you sing
Elixirs vomited noisily
Brought forward
I’m scared of your flags
cracking in the wind of your madness
I’m scared!
To you I confess my fear
I’m scared of your erected tents
Sparse in the flowered gardens
I’m scared of your adult games
In the pedestrian corridors
I know that one day
You will shoot me!
I’m scared
Yes, I confess my fear
I’m scared of your gloved hands
Hiding numerous cactus
I’m scared when a child
Claims for life in his cold cradle
I’m scared when he shows ecstasy
I know that one day
You will shoot him!
Adamou Idé writes: “…From my very inside, an acute feeling of injustice and bitter revolt emerged. I think I have not tried to understand… and I have cried: it was the voice of poetry! It became a weapon and a tribune for protest and denunciation. I claim for liberty, solidarity, brotherhood among men and I think that in every man there is a poet: But I also feel that poets are feared by those in power that use violence, who are prosperous at the expense of the collective suffering. When they are denounced, some poets are imprisoned, tortured, killed or exiled as if this was enough to kill the power of the word in them. The poets continue paying a harsh tribute for their liberty of thought. Again, poetry appears as the last bastion for the struggle for liberty! In these times, some powerful men of this world believe they are able to enslave others by means of unilateral thought, unfair economical laws, unjust wars and they want poets to speak in one way or another. Now, more than ever, we need poetry and poets committed to the struggle for peace, justice and tolerance! Lullaby poetry is intended for making children sleep, meanwhile bombs fall and destroy their legs: I have never believed in this kind of “colorless” and “odorless” poetry. I believe in words that name suffering and that wake up hope in open furrows by misery and tears. The poetic writing has allowed me to live an incredible adventure. An always-new adventure in a mysterious world of words. In the poem one feels that the agitated life of the words is being written, that they heap together to find a place in the verse, they hug each other to create rhythm, to provoke or stimulate the reader’s senses, and one never knows when the poem is finished or if it’s the poet that being tired has put down the weapons. But what is the matter if the poem is there and sings before you the real love and liberty!… “
"Baba Tandja" looms over the MNSD-Nassara leadership.
No end is yet in sight for the Nigerien political crisis, begun when President Tandja Mamadou, facing the end of his term-limited mandate on 22 December, decided to scrap the constitution of the 5th Republic, and grant himself three years grace period in which to create a 6th Republic. The alienation of most of the political class was expected, but the severity of ECOWAS rhetoric was likely not. Niger’s rulers would have expected this to be wrapped up by now, with the previous legal deadline for a new president to pass with a shrug. But the personal interest of current ECOWAS chair Nigeria — Niger’s massive neighbor and largest African trade partner — has meant that President Tandja has been excluded from the body, branded as a coup leader, and placed alongside Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara as a poster child for what’s wrong with West African governance.
And while Blaise Compaore, assigned mediation duties in Guinea, seems intent on finding a way for Dadis to stay in power despite his wholesale slaughter of his own people, Yar’Adua’s government has kept an unusual concentration of pressure on Niamey. [see Niger:Piling on the Pressure for details] Sadly, this has far exceeded any pressure the remarkably unified internal opposition has been able to bring to bear internally.
Should effective ECOWAS pressure escalate as they promise, seconded by sanctions by crucial donors like France, the EU, and the US, Niger’s new 6th Republic can’t carry on indefinitely. Current Chinese projects don’t fill the gap with direct payments. While uranium and oil revenue continue to flood in, too much of that has gone to support a small group of businessmen around Tandja to enable the government to balance the budget with it. Wages will not be paid, loans will not be forthcoming, the military will miss their trips to Fréjus, and there will be trouble.
But if Tandja is toppled or forced to give way in this manner, it will be an inside job by the political and military leadership who aided his new constitutional order.
–
Niger has had a lot of constitutions, and they tend to be none too creative rehashes of previous documents. The 6th was generated in less than a week, and declared “in effect” within days of the August referendum. It recycles much of the 5th Republic (semi-presidential 1999), with elements of the failed 4th Republic (General Baré Maïnassara’s strong presidency and ceremonial legislature). To give you a feel for the slapdash nature of current Nigerien jurisprudence, the constitution calls for a strong presidency which appoints all ministers — including the PM — and most of the judiciary and “independent” governing bodies. In most every public power carried over from the last constitution, there is simply a clause added which gives either the President or a body he appoints the power to suspend or override its function “when needed”. For new bodies, their description is invariably followed by something like “..whose functions and composition will be determined by law.” Later.
The “new” Legislature includes a National Assembly, whose law-making functions can be largely replaced by the President and his Council of Ministers. Their primary task, the annual budget legislation, must also be passed by a new second house, the Senate, which has not yet been created. The constitution says that the President will appoint a third of this Senate’s members, while bodies such a the council of Chieftancies and other government commissions will “indirectly elect” the remainder. I have yet to find any serious discussion of this body in the government’s daily mouthpiece, Le Sahel, let alone a schedule for it’s appearance.
The Nigerien National Assembly has historically sat in two short sessions each year. The first Hemicycle of the new Assembly has just wrapped up, but its hard to see what they accomplished. Committee rules were written up by a group led by former Communications Minister and close Tandja loyalist Mohammad Ben Omar, former PM and current MNSD party chief Seyni Oumarou was named President of the Assembly, and heads of each of the minor parties was given an important sounding office. because of the opposition boycott, there is no opposition in the Assembly. A budget for 2010 was announced in the President’s Council of Ministers and adopted by the National Assembly, calling for an increase in direct budget supports from foreign donors, which the government relies upon to pay the bills. That these will soon be cut by many donors seems to have eluded normally erudite Finance Minister Zeine. The leadership then wrapped up by chartering a junket to Angola for the 18th Joint Parliamentary Assembly of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific plus European Union (ACP/EU). All interested members were offered a large stipend to fly down and look like a real parliament. At least one member reportedly took the stipend but chose to stay in Niamey. And then the gavel fell of the first Assembly session of Niger’s 6th Republic.
And while the domestic and foreign press is rife with speculation, there seems little movement to resolve the crisis. The opposition, including two former Prime Ministers, one former President, and a large split from Tandja’s ruling MNSD, vows to eject the current President from power, and mark the 22nd with a final repudiation of his holding any legal office. Expect demonstrations and some violence in major cities.
Violence has flared in Niamey in August (bottom) and September (top).
Niger is an overwhelmingly rural society, in which the vast majority of the population do not participate in politics, intent as they are with meager rain-fed substance agriculture in the strip of Sahel along the south and west of the nation. The time leading up to harvest, taking place now or in the last month, is “the hungry season” in which rural people work much and eat little. Even many urban Nigeriens return to farms to help with the crop and pad their food supply. Rains in some areas of the west stopped for a crucial period in June this year, causing farmers there to replant, and millet crops to be less than expected. As if that were not preoccupation enough, the time after Tabaski and harvest begins the “exodé” when as many as a third of rural men (and a few women) travel as far afield as Ghana, coastal Nigeria, Benin or Côte d’Ivoire to work odd jobs, coming home in several months with clothes, supplies, and a little cash. Short of ECOWAS closing the borders, Nigeriens are unlikely to be roused to large scale political action in the next few months.
A recent cover of the state paper, Le Sahel, focuses on the PM's meetings abroad, and the business as usual at home.
is eager to split off the hard core Tazarché (pro-Tandja) forces who have become a political force parallel to the ruling MNSD. The Assembly elections of October were already read as such a movement, with the return of MNSD apparatchiks at the expense of an influx of “independent” business men close to the president and his sons. Yet Gamatié is technically himself an Independent, not a MNSD minister, and brought in for that reason.
The rumored “solution” to this crisis, the creation of a 7th Republic with Tandja as a figure head and his bête noire former ally Hama Amadou as head of a transitional authority, remains just rumor. The re-assertion of the old line MNSD over the pure Tazarchistes may make the political bloodletting easier to take, but many powerful men have publicly hitched their stars to the 6th Republic and the President himself.
Creeping personalization of rule is after all par for the course in such regimes, but a sudden and unexpected transition from one government to another is not a new phenomena in Niger. The genius of the Nigerien political class is, arguably, their ability to not only change political sides, but to successfully hit the “reset button” after dramatic change. Very few of the high ranking members of Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara’s 4th Republic saw their political careers — or access to the state — end following his death at the hands of his own former coup leaders in April 1999.
Tandja, whose government has been supported from the outset by the group of officers surrounding Chief of Staff General Moumouni Boureima, has since 2004 relied on the unwavering support of the RDP-Jama’a, Baré Maïnassara’s old party. Their only identifiable founding principle is the rollback of the 1999 immunity against those who carried out the April coup, including Moumouni Boureima. It’s current leader, Hamid Algabid flew to Abudja in November to plead with ECOWAS to support Tandja’s new regime. Still, the constitution of the 6th Republic maintains a blanket immunity for officers like Boureima.
Algabid is a good illustration of how reinvention is easy for the Nigerien elite. A Tuareg from Tanout, Algabid rose to the office of Secretary General of Finance in
Hamid Algabid
Hamani Diori’s First Republic. When Seyni Kountché led a coup in 1974 and imposed almost a decade of extra-constitutional government, Algabid flourished, being appointed to several international posts and becoming Minister of Finance. When a token civilian government was named in 1983, Algabid became its second Prime Minister. When the gray formless General Ali Saïbou succeeded to power on Kountché’s death, Algabid served him for a year, before being kicked up to head the Organisation of the Islamic Conference throughout both the authoritarian Second Republic and the post-revolutionary Third Republic. When Baré Maïnassara took power, Algabid failed in a bid to become Secretary General of the UN (!), and agreed instead to head the General-President’s new party, made up almost entirely of defectors from the boycotting civilian parties. After 1999, Algabid led RDP-Jama’a into a coalition with the social democratic PNDS (a leader in the opposition to Baré Maïnassara, and now Tandja) before changing their minds in 2004 and supporting the president.
So while a few diehards newly lifted to great heights will fall should Tandja go, most of the political class will just change seats. Look for that jockeying with an eye to a post-Tandja future at every meeting of Nigerien officials with ECOWAS. The final key is where it always was, with Moumouni Boureima and a group of several officers who are all veterans of the 1999 CRN coup government. [more on them in a forthcoming article] Jeune Afrique’s recent report of coup talk amongst some younger officers strikes at the very foundations of Tandja’s continued rule.
Even if nothing comes of that, the moment a 7th Republic looks more likely to those currently in government than the stumbling on of the 6th, Tandja will be carried out on his throne. Pressure is important, then, but unless either ECOWAS or the opposition exhibit to heretofore unseen ability to generate outside force or popular unrest, Tandja will exit thanks to an inside job.
ECOWAS and it's Nigerian representatives are playing rough.
On the 11th of November, the government of Nigerconfirmed the elections for it’s new parliament, boycotted by opposition and assailed as undemocratic from abroad. Two days before Finance Minister Zeine, who now serves at the will of the first President of the Sixth Republic, Tandja Mamadou, also announced the government budget for 2010. Like the August 18th unilateral transition from the semi-presidential Fifth Republic, this first budget of the Sixth Republic is a mixture of unchecked opacity and optimistic bluster.
Niger’s government announced it would spend some 735 billion CFA Francs (1.1 Billion Euros), up from 730 Billion FCFA the year before. Of course, 2009 saw hundreds of millions — no one is quite sure how much — being paid to the government of Niger for new foreign mining and oil contracts. Still, Niger says that they expect their internal tax revenue to increase to record levels and and their foreign supports budget to increase almost nine and a half percent, to 330 billion FCFA (505 million Euros). With projected internal tax and and contract revenue, of around 614 million Euros, the government has confidently promised to exactly cover their expenditures. These figures, with a projection of a %4.3 economic growth for the coming year — almost entirely based on exports of uranium — sound good enough.
Venture capitalists reading the regurgitation of such projections in outlets like Bloomberg News, might be fooled. Except that these figures are largely meant as propaganda. The independent NiameyCanard Dechaine paper asked the obvious question in response: “who are these foreign sources of income” who will make up half of the revenue in direct payments, and much of the contract revenue?
The constitutional coup of President Tandja has ground these foreign payments to a halt. The EU has frozen 180 billion Euros in direct payments for this year, and given a 30 day ultimatum for a return to constitutional government, before they cut off further funds. IMF organized funding for infrastructure projects, including support for the African Development Bank managed Kandadji Hydroelectric Dam project, as well as for the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) fund, has not been reviewed since the beginning of September, and will likely be effected, especially as Kandadji funding was funneled through ECOWAS, an organization which has suspended all work with the government of Niger. Add the suspension of US and French non-humanitarian programs, and Niger has a rather large hole in its pocket, even if France continues to buy their uranium and China keeps investing in oil, mining, and infrastructure.
If more bad news were needed, the agricultural season was poor in parts of Niger, a nation where over eighty prevent of the population rely on agriculture for their livelihoods. While not a disaster, a June dry gap following the first rains caused some areas to have to replant, and millet yields are low. Couple that with the knife edge politically, Niger is in even worse shape.
Goods being confiscated at the Nigerian border with Niger
ECOWAS president Nigeria seems to be taking a hard line, regardless — or perhaps because of — that nation’s less than transparent 2007 presidential elections. President Yar’Adua has placed former General and President Abdulsalami Abubakar in the lead for the so called “Abuja I” consultations beginning this week. On the eve of these meetings, Nigeria arranged for a small demonstration of its strength. Border guards at the three main crossings south of Maradi, Zinder and Tahoua stopped all commercial transport for at least a day. Travelers were searched, and goods were impounded. The border between these neighbors cuts through the midst of Hausaland, and the major markets for goods from Niger — apart from those big exports by the government — are sold in the markets of Kano and Katsina. A flurry of denials as to who ordered such a closure followed, but the point was surely made.
The government delegation to Abuja, made up of PM Ali Badjo Gamatié and other high Nigerien officials who have been jetting around the ECOWAS states to plead their case for several weeks, arrived in Nigeria on the 10th. According to the Niamey press, the party which included three former Prime Ministers and several other high level minister, were met at the airport by no Nigerian delegation, and had to rent their own cars. All experienced officials, the Nigerien delegation included former Prime Ministers Mamane Oumarou, Cheiffou Amadou, Hamid Algabid, Seini Oumarou, current Press Minister Kassoum Moktar, former Press Minister Mohamed Ben Omar, longtime party leader Sanoussi Tambari Jackou, and current Foreign Minister Aïchatou Mindaoudou.
At the Abuja Sheraton, they were made to sit a wait several hours by the Nigerians, and then General Abdulsalami refused to meet with the entire illustrious delegation, and insisted that the current Niger PM and Foreign minister be the only officials interviewed. The Foreign Minister’s meeting with the Nigerian Ambassador to Niger was reportedly repeated halted while the Nigerian took calls on his mobile. Meanwhile a forty member Nigerien opposition delegation has arrived in Abuja as well, and both the EU and ECOWAS are demanding a compromise deal be done directly with the Nigerien anti-Tandja activists.
The Nigerien opposition press has begun floating the answer: the 7th Republic. In this scenario, Tandja would become a figurehead President during an 18 month transition while an assembly of all stakeholders would be called to draft a new constitution, overseen by former President Mahamane Ousmane. Meanwhile opposition leader Mahamadou Issoufou would become head of government. If you think you’ve heard this before, you may be right. Military dictator Ali Saibou‘s failed 2nd Republic was edged out of power in much the same way, with him as figurehead, while a National Convention wrote a new constitution.
Ali Saibou
Will Tandja agree? I would be surprised. He’s shown a remarkable unwavering drive to remain in power at all costs, and there are clearly now powerful family and military cliques who are using Tandja as cover for their enrichment — or to simply stave off prosecutions which might follow a change of government.
The last Nigerien strongman, Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, was overthrown in similar circumstances.
On the other hand, Tandja might be wise to follow in the footsteps of Ali Saibou. Saibou retired to his home village in 1993, and to the best of my knowledge is still there. The next Nigerien strongman to be removed from power, Colonel / General / President Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara left the presidency in two body bags following a 1999 coup. Tandja might be reminded that the murder of that president took place only days after a then Nigerian President, Abubacar Abdulsalami, led ECOWAS negotiators in meetings with Baré Maïnassara over his annulment of promised elections. And the coup leaders who put Baré Maïnassara in power and took him out remain in places of influence in Tandja’s clique as well.
UPDATE 24 August: Nigerien Civil society activist Marou Amadou remains in arbitrary detention. According to the BBC he has been beaten in custody. Several other opposition activists arrested for protesting the coup remain in custody. Police have attacked peaceful protests, most recently on 22 August in Niamey, at which several opposition leaders were arrested. Also on 22 August Wada Maman, Secretary General of the “Front Uni pour la Sauvegarde des Acquis Démocratiques” (FUSAD), Board Member and Secretary General of the “Association Nigérienne de Lutte contre la Corruption” (ANLC), was detained by the military while waiting for a Niamey bus. He is being held without charge or representation.
Please demand the release of these activists.
A sample letter, addresses, and statements by Nigerien and international rights groups are below.
Further links to background material follows sample letter and statements.
==Independent statement=====
PLEASE COPY, SIGN, AND EMAIL, PRINT OR FAX TO THE ADDRESSES BELOW. EMAILS ARE EASY BUT PAPER LETTERS AND FAXES MAKE A STRONGER IMPACT.
To the honorable representatives of the Republic of Niger,
We deplore the recent wave of arrests by the government of Niger and the use of force to disperse peaceful protests. We demand the immediate release of all political prisoners, an end to political prosecutions, and a return to the rule of law and respect for human rights.
Nigerien authorities must respect dissent and their own constitution. The people of Niger have suffered too much since the struggle for democracy in 1991 to allow a handful of the powerful to return their nation to autocracy.
We support the rights of civil society and opposition groups to protest and assemble, and we support the general strike of the Nigerien labour confederations, the CDTN, CGSL-N, CNT, UGTN, UGSEIN, USPT, and the USTN.
We condemn the arrest of dissident journalists and the arbitrary closure of opposition press;
We condemn the arrests and use of force against peaceful protesters in on the day of the 4 August referendum, and in Niamey and elsewhere both before and after 4 August;
We condemn the use of force against those using peaceful civil disobedience on the day of the 4 August referendum in Illea and elsewhere on 4 August;
We condemn the arrests of opposition activists between 1 and 5 August, including:
*Zakari Oumarou, opposition leader, arrested and arbitrarily detained at Konni;
*Amadou Nomao, Deputy of the National Assembly, arrested and arbitrarily detained at Badaguichiri;
*Alhousseini Ousmane and Elhadj Idrissa Maïgoro, opposition members arrested at Tahoua;
*Dr. Douma, opposition member arrested at Ayorou;
We condemn the arrest between 4 and 11 August and arbitrary detention at Koutoukalé prison of opposition activist Monsieur Alassane Karfi;
We condemn the arbitrary detention by the Judiciary Police of President of the Front pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (FRD) Hamissou Moumouni;
We especially condemn the multiple arrests, unlawful detention at Koutoukalé prison and beating by FNIS (Ministry of Interior Paramilitary Police) of Marou Amadou, Vice Coordinator of the Collectif pour la Défense du Droit à l’énergie au Niger (CODDAE) and spokesperson of the FDD;
We condemn the unlawful detention at Koutoukalé prison beginning 22 August of Wada Maman, Secretary General of the “Front Uni pour la Sauvegarde des Acquis Démocratiques” (FUSAD), Board Member and Secretary General of the “Association Nigérienne de Lutte contre la Corruption” (ANLC).
We condemn the prosecution of Abdoulaye Tiemogo, editor of a private satirical weekly, Le Canard Dechaine and the orchestrated campaign to silence those who question the financial dealings of those close to the President of Niger.
Rest assured that the people of the world stand by the people of Niger is their demands for democracy, rule of law, judicial Independence, and economic transparency. The truth will come out, and the people of Niger will judge not only the behavior of their government, but those who failed to act in the defense of law.
With the deepest respect for your great nation,
Signed (Your Name)
=======Ends===========
Addresses:
=====================
TO: Ambassador of the Republic of Niger to the United States, S.E.M Toure Aminata Djibrilla Maiga
Embassy of the Republic of Niger
2204 R Street, NW,
Washington DC 20008
Secrétariat Directeur de Cabinet
Telephone: + 227 20-72-24-72
Directeur de Cabinet Adjoint
Telephone: + 227 20-72-36-67
—-
TO: Prime Minister of the Republic of Niger, Seini Oumarou;
Monsieur le Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement ;
Email: webmestre@assemblee.ne
Fax : + 227 20 73 58 59
TO: M. Garba Lompo, Ministre de la Justice,
Fax : +227 20 72 37 77
TO: M. Albade Aboufa, Ministre de l’Intérieur,
Fax: + 227 20 72 21 76
TO: Mission permanente du Niger auprès de l’Union européenne,
Fax : + 32 2 648 27 84
TO: Ambassadeur M. Adani Illo, Mission permanente du Niger auprès des Nations unies à Genève,
Avenue du Lignon 36 (2ème étage), 1219 Le Lignon, Suisse.
Fax: +41 22 979 24 51.
Email: missionduniger@gmail.com
====END ADDRESSES=====
=======Transparency International Statement========
Anti-corruption leader arrested in Niger as civil society faces increased intimidation
Berlin, 24 August 2009
Transparency International (TI) is seriously concerned about the arrest in Niger, of Wada Maman, Board Member and Secretary General of TI chapter, the Association Nigérienne de Lutte contre la Corruption (ANLC)
*http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2009/2009_08_24_niger_intimidation
=======Ends===========
=======Publish What You Pay statement===============
Action Alert: PWYP calls on the Nigerien government to end all forms of harassment against civil society leader Marou Amadou
Source: PWYP International – Action Alert
Date: 13 Aug 2009
PWYP strongly condemns the transfer into police custody of Marou Amadou, president of the United Front for the Safeguard of Democratic Assets (FUSAD), coordinator of the Advisory and Orientation Committee for the Defence of Democratic Rights (CROISADE), and member of the Réseau des Organisations pour la Transparence et l’Analyse Budgetaire (ROTAB) – Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Niger.
According to ROTAB/PWYP Niger, Marou Amadou was discharged on Tuesday, 12 August 2009 after appearing before the Court of First Instance in Niamey, where he had been summoned for “inciting disobedience of defense and security forces” and “regionalist propaganda”, following his arrest on 10 August 2009 by the Nigerien Judicial Police.
PWYP condemns Marou Amadou’s forced transfer into police custody just hours after a court had ordered his release.
PWYP therefore demands that the discharge decision be respected and calls for the immediate release of Marou Amadou.
PWYP urges the Nigerien authorities to guarantee Marou Amadou’s physical and moral integrity.
PWYP calls on President Mamadou Tandja to ensure an end to all forms of harassment and intimidation against Marou Amadou and civil society activists in Niger, and to guarantee freedom of speech and of the press in accordance with the international human rights standards Niger has committed itself to.
Actions Required:
PWYP asks that you write to the Nigerien authorities, Nigerien diplomatic representatives and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in your respective countries to draw their attention to your concerns and forward them this statement
=======Ends===========
=======Frontline Defenders Statement=======
Niger: Detention of human rights defender Mr Marou Amadou
2009/08/17
(Sample letter included)
*News Reports on the arrest of Marou Amadou
**http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5isewxWl32nJBbl2UP0n3QYpCKSYA
**http://www.voanews.com/english/Africa/2009-08-10-voa36.cfm
** BBC NEWS | Africa | Niger opposition figure ‘beaten’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8197439.stm
* Transparency International Statement (22 August)
* Opposition decalration 11 August http://pnds-tarayya.net/news/news.php?id=41
DÉCLARATION DU 11 AOÛT 2009 La Coordination des Forces pour la Démocratie et la République (CFDR) (Francais)
* Opposition decalaration on 4 August arrests
http://pnds-tarayya.net/news/news.php?id=38 (Francais)
*NIGER-En réaction à l’arrestation du président du Fusad, Amnesty international exige la libération de Amadou Arou
le Quotidien (Senegal) 19 August.
I’ve been waiting for the United States and Canadian governments to weigh in on the Nigerien political crisis. Today France released a less than pointed statement, accusing Nigerien government policies of “being outside the constitution”, while the EU was a little firmer, mentioning the cash it provides Niamey. Although members have expressed concern over Tandja’s coup, the bi-yearly meeting this Wednesday looks like it will be quiet, in part because its a closed door meeting, and in part because the Libyan government has denied visas and/or failed to find any accommodation for NGO representatives, members of African civil society groups, or reporters. ECOWAS / CEDEAO seem the best bet, in part because they hardly need another government to slide into a rather seedy dictatorship. Nigeria’s ruling class appears to have taken a distinct interest in seeing the back of Tandja (which may be enough to doom him).
QUESTION: Do you have anything on the political situation in Niger?
MR. KELLY: I don’t think so. No, I don’t. What’s going on in – QUESTION: There’s a political crisis. The president has dissolved the constitutional court and he is trying to stay in power – MR. KELLY: Yeah. QUESTION: — instead of getting reelected in September. MR. KELLY: Well, that doesn’t sound good. QUESTION: No. MR. KELLY: We’ll get you more information. QUESTION: Thank you. MR. KELLY: Okay. Thanks.
While reporters continue to carefully attribute the title “Coup d’Etat” to leaders of Niger’s opposition, events of the last 24 hours make it hard to spin the current situation in any other way.
This was the weekend for Coups: was the death of Michael Jackson assumed to distract us all? Regardless, a couple of Nigeriens have pointed out the uncanny similarities between the situation of President of HondurasManuel Zelaya and President of Niger Mamadou Tandja. Despite this, both crises are intimately linked to the history of these nations, and represent very different forces. (more…)
Just when you’d like to put it to bed, the constitutional crisis in Niger continues, weaving like a distracted taxi driver: from sigh to scream and back again.
I’ll focus a bit on three events of importance. After Tandja sent out a letter lecturing the Constiutional Court on their decision to stop his referendum, his main parliamentary ally — Ousmane’s CDS Rahama — finally pulled out of government. Ousmane, known for his sly political mauvering, finally yanked the plug, along with his eight members of the council of ministers. There are reports that the Minister of Defence (a CDS man) and one other want to stay on, so that will be interesting to watch.
Between this and Hama Amadou launching a split from the ruling MNSD Nassara (pithily named the “Mouvement Démocratique Nigérien pour une fédération africaine-MODEN/FA Lumana Africa”) Tandja/Ousmane haven’t a chance to survive the August 20 National Assembly election. The CDS has launched its own anti-Tazartché front (the MMD) to oppose the PNDS‘s FFD front. Assuming Hama, the ANDP (also assuming the rumors that they will join Hama’s new party en masse are untrue) and the Unions stay with the FFD, that coalition will form the next government. That is assuming the government abides by the election.
The 25 June General Strike, the first action taken by all seven of the Trades Union confederations, is the second big news. This was the first real successful general strike since the advent of the Vth Republic, and despite the press reports, there were real economic concerns amongst the political. There’s not been a government pay raise since 2005-6, mining unions are agitated by government negotiation tactics, and (crucially) the strike leaders complained that the current government is blocking access to the press by labor leaders.
Again, there are claims the Chiefs of the military have said they will take no part, but after the riots in Dosso, there were reports on the 24th that army vehicles were patrolling Niamey from 18:00 each night.
It seems every time the Nigerien political crisis nears some resolution, it swerves wildly in the other direction.
The inevitable end seems to be preordained against President Tandja, barring a true coup d’etat. But his cadre of supporters, comfortable in their offices can’t face it, and are thrashing around looking for a way to square the circle.
Let’s recap. A well funded campaign appears (titled “Tazartché”) to demand a way for Tandja to continue in office after his term runs out in December. Critics point to constitutional reasons the President can’t run for a third term, so his supporters float constitutional changes. These are clearly impossible under the current Constitution, so a whole new constitution is proposed. This would never pass the Assembly, so a referendum is proposed. The President’s coalition partners come out against his plan as does the Constitutional Court, so President Tandja dismisses the first and notes the second but announces his referendum anyway. The opposition bring a case to the court (which this time would be binding) and it rules against the president. This seems the end: unlike previous roadblocks, there is no appeal of the Constitutional Courts decisions, and they must be carried out in 30 days. The CENI (Electoral commission) has complied, announcing today parliamentary elections for August 20, and no referendum.
But will Tandja go quietly? He’s calling the Council of the Republic, a body composed of the heads of various government bodies: the Assembly, PM, Heads of the high courts, Electoral, Municipal, Economic, and Traditional rulers’ bodies. Article 56 in the constitution spells out the composition, that it should meet when “the regular functioning of public powers and continuity of the state are gravely threatened.” And everything else is kicked down the road to future law. Except that the Council has never been called or its powers defined previously. It’s intention was to be a body to mediate intractable political differences. Two years ago, when it seemed needed, the President created the office of Mediator of the Republic instead. Because let’s face it, if you want intractable political problems to just go away, you don’t call all of your most powerful rivals into one room. You appoint a retired politician to give speeches and submit a report to be reviewed at a later date by the President (which is the exact mandate of the Mediator of the Republic).
If they’re wise, the MNSD leadership — those who wish to continue in politics — will contest the Assembly elections on 20 August and let this constitutional change drop. The MNSD has never won an absolute majority in the Assembly, and there’s no chance they alone can control the next Assembly: there will be a divided government until the presidential elections in November, and c’est fini.
I can’t find anything in the Constitution which Tandja’s people could use to get around this latest ruling. But they may try. Those closest to Tandja may have burned their political bridges. If they see that there can be no way back for them in this rather lucrative political game, even at 2014 elections, they may simply seize power. Perhaps they’ll find some way to dismiss all the heads of the constituent elements of the Council of the Republic and declare a new enabling law giving the body power to rule when the Assembly is dismissed?
Parties and Civil Society: “Enough! To hell with Tazartché Long live democracy and onward to change!” Tandja: “You there! Dan Dubaï! They’re all turning on us?!” Dan Dubaï: “Papa continuity!! The People are with us!”
But even those heading the Tazartché campaign must know that ECOWAS/CEDEAO is in no mood to play. Events in Mauritania, Guniee and Guinee-Bissau have challenged African leaders’ high minded pronouncements about democratic transitions in West Africa, and current Presidents are eager to draw a bright line between the questionable “elections” which brought the heads of Nigeria or Burkina to power, and clearly unconstitutional coups. Woe be to Niamey should they find themselves on the unconstitutional side at this time. A press spat between Tazartché campaign leader Dan Dubaï and the ECOWAS representative / President of NigeriaUmaru Musa Yar’Adua does not bode well for Tandja. Telling Yar’Adua that ECOWAS and Nigeria have no say and no involvement in Niamey’s affairs was a less than politic move. This is not a fella you want to tic off, and it does not suggest those behind Tandja have much sense.
If Tandja’s people either come right out and declare a dismissal of all other institutions, or simply carry on as if nothing as happened, the Army is going to decide this, and this would be a sad burden for Nigeriens. I’ve read that the Chiefs of Staff announced they would have no involvement, although I can’t source this. If they really do sit this out completely, Tandja’s done. Things like the following make it so. For the first time — ever — all seven national trades union bodies agreed a unified strike against Tandja’s plans, only to postpone it when a Niamey court ruled it illegal. These seven can’t even march in the same May Day parades, so unity is a bit of a watershed. Note that the big political front march last week was also declared illegal, was postponed, but happened without interference. Are these groups negotiating with the MNSD leadership, or the police and military? Or are they just being cautious?
A recent editorial declared that, following the recent Constitutional Court ruling, Tazarcé had reached a cul de sac. One hopes they’ll turn around and be done with it. But there are precedents in recent Nigerien history.
Three historic parallels leap to mind.
One is the 1994 political crisis when then President Ousmane (head of the CDS, and now opposing the President tentatively) and then Prime Minister Issoufou (firebrand head of the PNDS and now leader of the opposition) fell out. The replacement PM was voted out by the Assembly, and Ousmane tried to appoint a loyalist PM to rule without the Assembly. Gridlock, even civil disobedience in the Assembly chamber ensued. Incidentally, Tandja was one of the leaders of these protests. But within a month Ousmane caved. He — obviously — survived politically. His climb down then, like his later involvement in the protests against 1996 coup and its various manipulations of the electoral process, has restored his democratic bona fides. The party coalitions shifted because of this, but the player remained in the game. Now anyone too associated with Tandja is in danger of permanent ejection, and we could see the next government return to the 1991-1994 consensus that the former military MNSD party is too tainted with authoritarianism to be an acceptable political partner. This may explain the recent low profile of Prime Minister (and recently minted party chief) Seyni Oumarou.
A second parallel might be 1999, when the marches and protests of politicians and civil society goaded the military into a coup, and a return to democratic rule. This would obviously be bad for Tandja, even if he didn’t end up like General Baré Maïnassara, leaving the Presidency in two body bags.
The third parallel is 1991. When strikes and marches were suppressed under the military, tensions boiled over. University students were shot down on a march over Niamey’s Kennedy bridge. The military offered some piecemeal reforms. But Niamey civil society simply took power. Opposition groups, unions, and community organizations convened a National Convention (like that in France following liberation, and more recently like that in Benin), and declared itself the sovereign ruler of the nation, wrote a constitution, and launched the nations first real elected government.
As an outsider, this seems like one of the proudest moments in Niger’s history. But it was one that came at a high cost, both in lives lost and in the social and economic costs of scraping all Niger’s institutions and their slow recreation over two years of sometimes contentious debate. It would be a shame if Nigeriens had to start over once again just 16 years later. But they have proven they can if they need to, and that must be a source of hope.
Two or three thoughts for the day. A review of Tom Goyens’ “Beer and Revolution: The German Anarchist Movement in New York City, 1880-1914.” is available. I may reprint it in full, as it’s under Creative Commons licensing. Allow me to digress (or not to, given the subject). Creative Commons is a Copyright/Left for creative works, which I think is generally superior to the GNU Public License. If you’re unaware of this, and you produce text, art, or photographs, you really owe it to the world to take a crash course. Copyright, which has expanded like a disease over the last fifty years, is doomed. In fact, it has expanded like antibodies fighting an overwhelming infection: proliferating in a failed attempt to smother its stronger foe. Information wants to be free, and all that.
But even with CC licenses you owe it to the rest of us to remember that the only thing you deserve from your work is the right to be identified as the person who created it, and recognized for exactly what you created. Try to impose a more strict license than that — which you can do in the CC — and it’s as doomed as copyright. It’s the intellectual equivalent of “those who don’t work don’t eat.” And since modern Capitalism is based upon one group of people benefiting from the work of other people, Copyright is going to go down fighting. Think “Terminator: Salvation”, but with less natural dialogue.
Second, I’ve been slightly obsessing about the papers recently: not the normal ones, but Niamey’s latest political crisis through the distorted mirror of the thriving newspapers of Niger‘s capital. Every day’s Le Sahel (the government rag), Republicain, Roue de l’Histoire, and Le Canard déchaîné are piped on line by two expatriate run websites, which means they probably have more readers abroad than they do at home (see below).
The President is attempting a slow motion coup, under the slogan “Tazartché”. My dictionary says that’s “continuity” in Hausa, but your results may vary. That a 71 year old ruler’s pals don’t like constitutional term limits (they want a refurendum on a New “Sixth Republic” before this November’s elections) is no surprise. One must give props to the writers of the 1999 constitution, though. Article 36 says that the President is limited to two Five year terms. Article 136 then says, that Article 36 (amongst others) is unrevisable. In any way. And yet President / Lieutenant Colonel Tandja and his MNSD party — created in 1987 as a single party modeled on Mussolini and Franco’s Integral Nationalist “managed” corporatism – want to pull an end run. Who in New York does this remind us of? Except in Niamey there is a vibrant opposition, massive protests, and an outside authority (ECOWAS) saying “changing the rules just before an election is a coup”.
As an aside, I’ve just learned that Mike Bloomberg is legally 5′ 6”, although he had previously pretended to be 5′ 7”, and even 5′ 1” on a drivers license. Isn’t that a felony? Additionally, anyone who’s stood near him thinks 5′ 6” is an exageration. Not that being short is bad, but being dishonest about it is a sign you might enjoy large cocaded hats and invading Austria.
Over %80 of Nigeriens are illiterate. Most don’t have access to clean water. Most live in rural communities and grow crops to feed their families, sell the excess when available, and travel for a few months after harvest doing odd jobs in Ghana or Nigeria to earn some cash. If the rains don’t come, there is little safety net. In part, this is poverty. In part this is because the intrusion of world markets since around 1980 (forced by the IMF and World Bank as “deregulation”) have turned rice and other basics into commodities, speculated upon by traders in London or Chicago, and consequently sold at prices matching what the Western Middle Classes can pay, but bought from government subsidized corporate agribusiness at prices much lower, and in volumes much higher, than any farmer can produce even in the poorest nations of the world. Given that reality, the newspapers slandering the largely ideologically vapid horsetrading that goes on amongst the Niamey elite is meaningless.
And that’s different from New York City only by degree, not by disease.
How sad is it that I’m this excited about a book of history – polisci essays? How additionally sad is it that I’m trembling in terror over my girlfriend’s reaction that I just spent $40 on a whim?
Regardless, I’m very excited about finding a copy of “Army and Politics in Niger” (“Armee et politique au Niger”, actually) which was just published in 2008 by Codesria, but is already distributed in Europe and North America. Finding careful writing about contemporary Niger is difficult, and I’m usually sent off to local papers, Jeune Afrique, or the reference section to indulge my habit. I’d been looking for Kimba Idrissa’s “Niger: Etat et démocratie” for some time (with little luck), so imagine my joy at discovering this edited volume.
As I noted on the 10th of March, the CSRD junta in Niger has replaced all the civilian Region Governors with military men to administer local affairs during the transition. We now have the full list, and while I for one hate to see any military governing, a careful look at the men (all men) coming and going in Niger's Regions gives us an opportunity to examine what's going on behind the scenes, and what it augurs for the future.
More ...
Nigeriens were - are - undoubtedly pleased that the army stepped in to end a newly installed dictatorship. But criticisms of this so called "good coup" are beginning to appear even amongst its strongest supporters. With many months of transitional rule ahead, these whispers give us some idea of the problems the junta will soon face.
One doesn't see much film, let alone color film, of colonial era African football. So you can imagine my delight when I stumbled across clips of a French colonial propaganda newsreel featuring the my favorite African club side wining a colonial cup final from 1956.
The new military Junta in Niger has released their first real vision of their promised return to democracy. Niger's expectations, a redux of recent history, are being played to by the soldiers.
After a day of confusion, President Tandja and his supporters are under arrest by the military. I have maintained the live updates from the 18th, and added an in depth analysis of the new CSRD junta.
The US government will make much of the arrests of three Malians who they say were part of a West African criminal network, devoted to drug smuggling and Osama Bin Laden. So far all we have is hype and what looks like the entrapment of low level criminals.
The December 18th anniversary of the Nigerien Republic begins a series of dates which may bring the political crisis to a boil, just as mediators think they've made a breakthrough.
A brief look, if one is possible, at the simmering crisis in the northeast Central African Republic. As commentators try to come to grips with this often ignored nation, here is some recommended reading for Anglophones interested in the République centrafricaine.
Niger's rulers would have expected this to be wrapped up by now, with the previous legal deadline for a new president to pass on the 22nd with a shrug. But fears (or hopes) remain that some of those most loyal to the project are looking to abandon their President
Join the second march on the UN by Guineans and their allies in New York City, Thursday December 8th. If you can't make it, there are ways to get involved, so please do!
As the "Abuja I" talks begin with ECOWAS, President Tandja of Niger is increasingly backed into a political and financial corner. Will his "6th Republic" be sacrificed as a way out?
The local elections are odd enough. But "Claude Levi-Strauss" is the 4th most popular search on Yahoo? Right between "Dancing With The Stars" and "H1N1 Symptoms".
I know all the debates about voting not changing anything, and while I tend to agree, I'm not asking you to overthrow capitalism with a vote. It won't do that. But it is a splendid soapbox.... So Vote Reverend Billy for NYC Mayor, Greg Pason for NJ Governor, and Debbie Rose for City Council.
Popular sound systems blend traditional sounds with DJ beats, and keep people across Bamako on their feet. But will Mali's capitol ban the "Balani Show" dance parties?
![Reblog this post [with Zemanta]](http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=3c194b6f-8aab-4169-b91c-0fd86447de7a)
![Reblog this post [with Zemanta]](http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=8fc533a9-ff0a-4bee-b0d5-5cb09a450e41)
![Reblog this post [with Zemanta]](http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=e1da1966-e382-45fb-8b76-478eebc75de5)
![Reblog this post [with Zemanta]](http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=370ebf4d-a9a2-4fd8-bb1b-14934aa54204)
As I noted on the 10th of March, the CSRD junta in Niger has replaced all the civilian Region Governors with military men to administer local affairs during the transition. We now have the full list, and while I for one hate to see any military governing, a careful look at the men (all men) coming and going in Niger's Regions gives us an opportunity to examine what's going on behind the scenes, and what it augurs for the future.
More ...
Nigeriens were - are - undoubtedly pleased that the army stepped in to end a newly installed dictatorship. But criticisms of this so called "good coup" are beginning to appear even amongst its strongest supporters. With many months of transitional rule ahead, these whispers give us some idea of the problems the junta will soon face. 
One doesn't see much film, let alone color film, of colonial era African football. So you can imagine my delight when I stumbled across clips of a French colonial propaganda newsreel featuring the my favorite African club side wining a colonial cup final from 1956. 
The new military Junta in Niger has released their first real vision of their promised return to democracy. Niger's expectations, a redux of recent history, are being played to by the soldiers.
After a day of confusion, President Tandja and his supporters are under arrest by the military. I have maintained the live updates from the 18th, and added an in depth analysis of the new CSRD junta.
"Poets are feared by those in power that use violence, who are prosperous at the expense of the collective suffering." - Adamou Idé 
a dinosaur comic about about potable water conservation in sub-Saharan Africa?
The US government will make much of the arrests of three Malians who they say were part of a West African criminal network, devoted to drug smuggling and Osama Bin Laden. So far all we have is hype and what looks like the entrapment of low level criminals. 
The December 18th anniversary of the Nigerien Republic begins a series of dates which may bring the political crisis to a boil, just as mediators think they've made a breakthrough.
A brief look, if one is possible, at the simmering crisis in the northeast Central African Republic. As commentators try to come to grips with this often ignored nation, here is some recommended reading for Anglophones interested in the République centrafricaine.
Niger's rulers would have expected this to be wrapped up by now, with the previous legal deadline for a new president to pass on the 22nd with a shrug. But fears (or hopes) remain that some of those most loyal to the project are looking to abandon their President
Join the second march on the UN by Guineans and their allies in New York City, Thursday December 8th. If you can't make it, there are ways to get involved, so please do!
"If you watch it frame by frame you can pinpoint the exact moment his heart rips in half..."
Anti-fascist activist Ivan "Bonecrusher" Khutorskoy was murdered in Moscow this Monday. 
The local elections are odd enough. But "Claude Levi-Strauss" is the 4th most popular search on Yahoo? Right between "Dancing With The Stars" and "H1N1 Symptoms". 
I know all the debates about voting not changing anything, and while I tend to agree, I'm not asking you to overthrow capitalism with a vote. It won't do that. But it is a splendid soapbox.... So Vote Reverend Billy for NYC Mayor, Greg Pason for NJ Governor, and Debbie Rose for City Council. 
Popular sound systems blend traditional sounds with DJ beats, and keep people across Bamako on their feet. But will Mali's capitol ban the "Balani Show" dance parties?
A recent seizure of US arms in Nigeria highlights the profit and loss of small arms supplied to West Africa.
Blood on the streets of Conakry is a price the Junta is willing to pay for power.